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Concern over large annual budget deficits and the contribution entitlement 
growth has played in this growth, has forced Congress to seek deficit reduction through 
entitlement reform. This thesis examines congressional policy toward military retirement 
reform as one part of this process. Through budget reconciliation, Congress enacted military 
retirement deficit reduction measures in 1993 which delayed retiree COLAs in fiscal 1994-
99, but subsequent legislation partially rolled back these delays. Reconciliation instructions 
in 1995 led to a new deficit reduction initiative affecting military retirement called High-
One. Political pressure prevented High-One froni becoming law, with mineral sales 
substituted to achieve the necessary savings. The Balanced Budget Act of 1995, which 
incorporated the mineral sales, was vetoed. Study of this legislative activity provides 
important insight into Congress's view of military retirement in deficit sensitive times. It 
provides a comprehensive record of these events and concludes that future deficit reduction 
entitlement reform is certain to include military retirement. The form and value of future 
reform is likely to include further CPI based COLA reductions. While other structural 
military retirement reforms are feasible, their contributions must be more critically assessed 
relative to their impact on force structure objectives. 
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Congress, in executing its budget responsibilities, struggles to seek new and 
additional sources of deficit reduction. In doing so, Congress has come to view military 
retirement as one such contributor. This thesis explores the Congressional perspective on 
military retirement and how it has altered the system to capture deficit reduction savings. 
The primary focus is on the recent changes, or attempted changes, to the military 
retirement structure and enhancements. However, to more fully understand the recent 
activity, a broader view of military retirement is important. 
During the 1980s, there were two signi~cant changes to the military retirement 
system. These changes reduced the value of the military retirement benefit to those 
affected, and through other budgetary changes enabled savings from these retirement 
reforms to accrue immediately. In an effort to achieve additional spending reductions, 
Congress drafted legislation in 1993 that reduced the retirement benefit for those already 
retired by adjusting the effective dates of the Cost OfLiving Allowance (COLA) between 
1994 and 1998. While the COLA was not reduced, the dates on which they became 
effective were delayed by several months in each of those years. This was to yield a 
savings of approximately $2.3 billion over five years. Due to political pressure and fiscal 
inequity between the military and civil service retirement adjustments, there has been 
some legislative retreat with respect to these COLA adjustments. 
In 1995, Congress again attempted to alter the military retirement system. These 
changes involved adjusting the effective retirement pay computation basis from the base 
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pay during the month a service member retires to an average of the last 12 months base 
pay. This adjustment, referred to as the High-One, would have applied only to those 
service members who joined the service prior to September 1980. Unlike the 1993 
changes, these proposals were met with a loud and immediate rebuttal. Yielding to the 
political fallout, the High-One legislation failed. 
In considering both these cases, this thesis examines the components of success in 
the first case, failure in the second, and the forces and issues that influenced each 
outcome. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The thesis begins by offering an overview of the three military retirement plans 
affecting service members. These include the Current System, which applies to service 
members who entered service before September 1980, High-Three for members entering 
between September 1980 and August 1986, and Redux, which governs all those who 
entered after August 1986. The Current System is the oldest and provides the basis from 
which the others were adapted. Examination of these programs and the legislative 
changes which brought them about, provides the first glimpse of the Congressional 
perspective on military retirement. 
Following this treatment of the structure of military retirement, the thesis 
examines the Congressional budget process as it relates to military retirement. 
Specifically, it indicates how the budget process has been changed to more efficiently 
capture retirement change savings. The transition from the pre-1984 annual 
appropriations process to the establishment of the Military Retirement Fund and the 
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corresponding budget implications of these changes are described. Adoption of accrual 
accounting for military retirement budgeting and its enabling contribution in capturing 
retirement reform savings is explained. This aids in understanding the impact and benefit 
of changes to the military retirement structure within the context of deficit reduction. 
These changes provide an immediate savings impetus that has focused the Congressional 
budget process on military retirement changes. 
Another element of military retirement benefits and the budget process, the 
COLA, is examined from both a historical perspective and in deficit reduction terms. 
COLAs, originally designed to protect military retiree purchasing power from the effects 
of inflation, have been viewed by Congress in several ways. Chapter IV tracks the 
original transition to a Consumer Price Index (CPI) based COLA as a cost savings 
measure, to the CPI+ 1 formula in the 1970s designed to protect retiree purchasing power 
in the face of minor implementation delays, to prolonged delays and reduced COLA 
initiatives as tools to achieve deficit reduction. Each phase represents a different 
Congressional perspective. 
The thesis turns next to the 1 03rd and 1 04th Congresses. Both Congresses 
achieved deficit reduction through military retirement COLA adjustments. However, the 
final form was quite different than the original legislative intent. After originally 
legislating COLA delays, both Congresses retreated from these measures and sought 
suitable alternative savings. During this legislative turmoil, new military retirement 
related deficit reduction initiatives emerged. The process, participants and budget 
consequences of each of these measures is examined in detail. This study provides recent 
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insight into Congressional policy and perspective with respect to military retirement . It 
also examines the political consequences of this form of entitlement reform in the face of 
an effective constituent lobby. Additionally, it helps establish the context, primarily 
deficit reduction, and the measures Congress will pursue in trying to achieve its 
objectives. 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis primarily involves the Congressional budget process and 
military retirement. It is a budgetary look at military retirement from a Congressional 
perspective, addressing changes in military retirement and its ability to contribute to 
deficit reduction. It evaluates the feasibility of utilizing such changes as tools, 
considering the existing political realities that surround entitlement reform. While 
military retirement is described from its earliest periods, the general scope begins in 1958 
and progresses from there. Specific attention is directed at the activities ofthe 103rd and 
1 04th Congresses, covering 1993 to 1996. 
The expected value of this thesis is to provide a detailed understanding of 
military retirement and the Congressional budget process. It provides a consolidated 
record of the events, proponents, opponents and key legislation related to the most recent 
military retirement adjustments and proposed changes. The result is a detailed 
understanding of the Congressional roles, missions, and authority in military retirement 
budgeting under conditions of extreme pressure to reduce the federal deficit by cutting all 
forms of spending. This study should be of value to Department ofDefense (DoD) 
officials and Support Area Analysts responsible for studying military retirement issues. 
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It should provide the necessary insight required to more effectively address these issues 
as they develop in future budget debates. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Numerous sources that address military retirement and the Congressional budget 
process were referenced in preparing this study. Pertinent data was drawn from 
Congressional hearing records, committee reports, conference agreements, reconciliation 
materials, and the respective defense authorization and appropriation bills that address 
the military retirement adjustments. Additional information was obtained by reviewing 
DoD documents, professional journals, periodicals, and news reports. 
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II. REVIEW OF MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
To more fully understand the relevant congressional policy regarding military 
retirement benefits, a reasonable description of the current system is appropriate. This 
chapter outlines the various annuity systems that currently constitute the pension 
programs available to service members. While these systems are similar, understanding 
their unique distinctions is important because Congress has approached them both 
unilaterally and individually through cost reduction legislation. 
Currently within the military, there are three different retirement benefit 
programs. The three systems are usually referred to by their dominant characteristics 
with the first regarded as the Current System, the second, the High Three and the third is 
usually called Redux. The latter two are the result of legislative changes to the Current 
System that has been in place since 1947 [Ref 1: p. 28]. The Current System is used as 
the basis of comparison since it serves almost all current retirees and all members who 
entered the service before September 8, 1980 [Ref 2: p. 19]. The date when a member 
entered service determines which system he or she is governed by. The commonality and 
distinctions between each are outlined below. 
A. THE ANNUITY AT 20 YEARS 
Common to each of the military retirement benefit programs is the 20 year 
annuity feature. Service members become eligible to receive benefits upon achieving 20 
years of service. There is no earlier eligibility or vesting in the retirement system for 
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service less than 20 years. Once eligible, a service member is entitled to receive 
retirement benefits for the remainder of his or her life. [Ref. 1: p. 6] 
Since eligibility begins at 20 years of service, an understanding has developed 
that military retirement benefits amount to a 20 year retirement. The law stipulates that 
at 20 years, a service member becomes eligible to retire, while at 30, he or she is entitled 
to retire. Service members who wish to retire prior to serving the full30 years, must 
request permission to retire early. Typically, permission is granted. But those who retire 
early (prior to 30 years) are immediately placed in reserve status and are subject to recall. 
[Ref. 3: p.1 05] 
For service members retiring from active_ duty, there is no age eligibility 
requirement that must be satisfied prior to receiving benefits. However, service members 
retiring from the reserves do have an age eligibility requirement. Service personnel who 
retire from the reserve forces do not begin receiving pay benefits until they are sixty 
years of age. [Ref. 1: p. 6] 
B. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
1. The Current System 
Perhaps the most understood and most referenced of the three retirement benefit 
systems is the Current System. The beginning benefits associated with this plan amount 
to 50 percent of a service member's basic pay at 20 years of service. This is the oldest of 
the three systems and the one that covers almost all of the current population of retired 
service members. The 50 percent at 20 reference derives from the formula used in 
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determining the benefit a service member is eligible to receive when he or she first 
becomes vested. [Ref 4: pp. 11-12] 
Since 18 55, gross percentages of military compensation have been utilized in 
determining retired compensation. The legislation that serves as the original basis for the 
Current System is the Naval Service Appropriation Act of 1917. This law established the 
2.5 percent per years of service determination method. It also established the 75 percent 
of basic pay retirement compensation cap. This cap is achieved after 30 years of service. 
[Ref 5: p. 453] 
To determine the benefit amount, a service member multiplies the years of service 
by 2.5 percent to determine the annuity factor. Next, the annuity factor is multiplied by 
the basic pay received in the month of retirement. This determines the monthly annuity 
value. For a service member serving exactly 20 years, the point of initial vesting, the 
annuity factor to apply to the basic pay equals 50 percent. For example, if a service 
member's basic pay during the month of retirement is $2261.40 and that member served 
exactly 20 years, the value of the monthly annuity would be calculated as follows: 
20 years x .025 x $2261.40 = $1130.70/month 
For periods of service beyond 20 years, the annuity factor is increased by 2.5 
percent per year to a maximum of75 percent. This maximum is achieved after 30 years 
of service. For service beyond 30 years, the annuity factor remains constant at 75 
percent. For part-year service, the annuity factor is adjusted for fractions of years (in 
months) times the 2.5 percent. For example, a service member who serves 23.5 years 
would have an annuity factor of58.75 percent. 
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When determining the actual value of the monthly annuity, the annuity factor is 
multiplied by the basic pay in the month the service member retires. Only basic pay is 
included. It is important to point out that while this system is considered a 50 percent 
benefit program, it is based entirely on basic pay. No other compensation components 
are included in the annuity valuation. Therefore, in real or total compensation terms, the 
actual annuity benefit percentage is lower than 50 percent. 
Determination of which system a service member is eligible for is based on when 
a service member joined the armed forces. The actual contractual date is called the Pay 
Entry Base Date (PEBD). To be eligible for the 50 percent at 20 program just described, 
a service member must have joined the armed forces and have a PEBD prior to 
September 8, 1980. 
2. The High Three 
The High Three system of military retirement benefits became law with the 
Department ofDefense Authorization Act of 1981. The impetus for this change emerged 
from three congressional concerns. First, Congress sought to reduce the high and 
increasing costs associated with military retirement. Second, Congress wanted to raise 
the pay of active members and needed appropriate offsetting cost reductions elsewhere. 
And finally, in addition to reducing costs in the out years, adopting the High Three 
system made the defense system comparable to the Civil Service Retirement System 
(CSRS). The CSRS already employed the High Three concept. [Ref 5: pp. 459-460] 
The High Three system is very similar to the current program just described. The 
annuity factor determination is identical. The difference is that the basic pay in the 
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month of retirement is not used in determining the annuity value. Instead, an average of 
the high three years of basic pay, which a service member earned, is utilized to determine 
the annuity value. Usually this is the last three years of a service member's career. 
Service member eligibility for this retirement benefit system is also governed by 
when he or she joined the armed forces. This system applies to those service members 
whose PEBD falls on or between September 8, 1980 and July 31, 1986. [Ref. 2: p.19] 
3. Redox 
The Redux, or Reduced Retirement Benefit system of military retirement benefits 
was enacted with the Military Retirement Reform Act of1986. This act was passed on 
August 1, 1986 and applies to all service members who entered the military on or after 
that date. [Ref 1: p.6] While the change associated with the High Three was an attempt 
to reduce costs, it did little to change the character and impact of military retirement 
compensation. Redux represents a significant attempt to both reduce the costs associated 
with military retirement expenditures and alter the early retirement bias of the previous 
systems. [Ref. 6: p. 8] 
Like the other programs, Redux possesses the 20 year annuity eligibi~ity. That is, 
a service member remains ineligible to receive benefits until he or she reaches 20 years 
of service. But unlike the others, the annuity factor determination is not a simple 2.5 
percent times the years of service. The computation is slightly more complex. First, 
during the initial 20 years, the annuity factor increases by two percent per year. So a 
service member's annuity factor is only 40 percent at exactly 20 years. Thereafter, the 
annuity factor increases at a rate of 3. 5 percent per year for years or fractions of years (in 
11 
months) between 20 and 30 years of service. This achieves the same 75 percent annuity 
factor cap at 30 years of service that the previous plans possess. Like the High Three 
plan, the annuity factor determined under the Redux plan is then applied to the averaged 
High Three years of basic pay. This reduced annuity factor remains in effect until the 
retiree reaches age 62. It then reverts to the same 2.5 percent per years of service 
computed under the Current and High Three plans. [Ref. 1: p. 6] 
By creating an annuity factor growth differential between a careerist's initial 
service period (years 1 through 20) and the second (years 21 through 30), Congress 
attempted to alter the career length incentives offered under the previous systems. While 
the current and the High Three programs appeared to have an early retirement bias, 
Redux represents an inducement for longer service for the mid-careerist. 
In addition to changing incentives, Congress also wanted to reduce retirement 
expenditures. Redux achieved this by reducing the required expenditures associated with 
those service members who retired early. Instead of paying 50 percent, the government 
will now only have to pay 40 percent of the High Three years ofbase pay to a service 
member who retires when first eligible. Additionally, while the annuity factor 
differential was designed to entice longer service, it also requires less expenditures per 
year, relative to the other programs, for any service member who retires before the 30 
year statutory requirement. 
Table 1 below provides a relative comparison of the actual annual annuity values 
for selected retirement grades and years of service (YOS). The table is based on 1996 










Annual Retired Pay Under the Three Current Military 
Retirement Systems, 1996 







Source: Adapted from 1996 DoD Military Pay Chart. 








A chief complaint voiced during congressional consideration of the cost 
escalation of military retirement benefits has been the impact of compounding and the 
application of the Cost ofLiving Allowances (COLAs). In order to mitigate some of 
these effects, Congress also implemented changes to the COLA application rates. 
Both the current and the High Three plans described above are fully indexed for 
inflation. Each year, the basic pay component of the annuity formula is increased at 
some rate to compensate for the degradation of buying power associated with inflation. 
For the current and High Three plans, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to index 
the basic pay to correct for this inflation-related loss. [Ref 2: p.19] 
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In order to achieve greater savings with the Redux plan, Congress changed the 
annual COLA increase application rate. Where previously the CPI was used, under 
Redux, this was changed to the prevailing CPI minus one percentage point. Therefore, 
from the time a service member retires, the High Three basic pay component of the 
annuity formula is increased by the CPI-1. This continues until the service member 
reaches 62 years of age. At this point, the High Three basic pay component undergoes a 
one-time correction to bring the basic pay factor up to the value associated with full CPI 
adjustments. That is, the basic pay component is increased to the value it would have 
been if it had increased at the full CPI during the period from retirement to age 62. From 
this point on, the COLA increase reverts back to the CPI minus one percentage point. It 
is not readjusted again. [Ref 2: pp. 19-20] 
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ill. BUDGETING FOR MILITARY RETIREMENT 
The budget process with respect to military retirement underwent significant 
changes in 1984 with the establishment of the Department ofDefense Military 
Retirement Fund. In order to fully appreciate the impact and benefits of these reforms, 
and the Congressional budget process changes that accompanied them, an understanding 
of the prior process is helpful. This chapter describes the previous process, that is, how 
Congress budgeted for military retirement pay prior to the 1984 changes. Then, the 
Military Retirement Fund (MRF) is described and finally, how the Congressional budget 
process controls the flow of funds through the Current System is explained. 
A. "PAY -AS-YOU-GO" MILITARY RETIREMENT FUNDING 
Prior to the establishment of the Military Retirement Fund in 1984, the budget 
process associated with military retired pay was essentially a pay as you go system. The 
Department ofDefense, through the President and Congress, budgeted annually for the 
expected outlays associated with military retirees. With each annual defense budget 
submission, the Department of Defense would submit a budget request for the retired 
military personnel account as part of the annual defense budget. This request was based 
on actuarial estimates ofthe size ofthe retiree population, relevant economic 
assumptions about the economy and anticipated changes to military pay scales. [Ref 5: 
pp. 711-714, Ref 7: p. 15] 
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1. The Pre Reform Budget Process 
Through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Defense 
Department develops and requests an appropriate level of funding to support the 
national defense budget function. Once complete, the defense budget request is 
forwarded to the President. The President, through the Office ofManagement and 
Budget (OMB), then develops his overall budget request, which includes the annual 
defense budget request. [Ref 8: p. iii] 
The OMB utilizes 19 functions to structure the President's Budget. The budget 
function assigned to national defense is 050. Within this overall national defense budget 
request is the budget subfunction 051, which governs Department ofDefense specific 
functions. This category includes all monies controlled by the Department ofDefense 
(DoD) for DoD programs. Included in the annual DoD budget submitted to the President 
was a request for funds for the Retired Military Personnel account. The request for this 
account represented the amount the Secretary of Defense anticipated as necessary to pay 
the projected population of retirees for the fiscal year under consideration. [Ref. 7: p. 15, 
Ref. 8: p. 3] 
After the President delivers his budget, Congress takes legislative action on it. 
The typical legislative budget process includes three key phases. Congress first agrees on 
a Concurrent Budget Resolution. This establishes a ceiling or top line for funding of 
defense programs in the form of budget function 050, the first budget function in the 
Resolution. Next, the Authorization committees draft authorizing legislation for 
consideration by the entire Congress and subsequent Presidential signature. This 
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establishes new programs and provides the authority to execute the functions of 
government. With respect to military retirement, defense authorization bills structure the 
eligibility requirements, valuation, computational procedures, and administrative statutes. 
It is through the authorization process that programs such as the Military Retirement 
Fund are put in place. Finally, the appropriations process occurs. Appropriations bills 
provide the budget authority to fund the defense programs. Prior to 1985, all money 
required to fund military retirement was received through the annual defense 
appropriations acts. The annual defense appropriations act provided the DoD with the 
budget authority to pay retiree benefits. This annual appropriation funding for military 
retirement benefits continued until the establishment of the Military Retirement Fund. 
[Ref 8: pp. 24-36] 
B. THE ROAD TO MILITARY RETIREMENT REFORM 
During the seventies, the military retirement system came under 
increasing pressure for a variety of reasons. Chief among these reasons was cost growth. 
The chart below illustrates the dramatic growth trend associated with military retirement 
costs. 
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Source: DoD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement Syst'em, FY1994. 
Other elements of concern included the perceived generosity of benefits relative 
to non-defense pension plans, the benefit system's early retirement bias, and its 
weakness as a force structure management tool. These concerns led to numerous studies 
aimed at changing the existing system. While many of the change recommendations led 
to the somewhat marginal benefit reforms described in Chapter II, two studies focused on 
the military retirement budgeting process. [Ref 6: pp. 4-15, Ref 10: pp. 35-46] 
The chief complaint about the pay as you go system, in the face of rising costs, 
was that regardless of what Congress did to change the benefit structure of future retirees, 
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no cost savings would be achieved until those service members began retiring. [Ref 11: 
pp.1-6, Ref 12: p. 19] Presumably, the earliest benefits of cost saving measures would 
be delayed for a minimum of 20 years. 
Another complaint about the intergenerational, pay as you go system was that it 
distanced or removed the significant cost consequences of personnel and compensation 
decisions. That is, when considering force structure changes or basic pay increases, 
decision makers had only to consider the immediate budget impact, which was 
negligible, potentially ignoring larger, long-run costs associated with future retirement 
benefits. [Ref 11: p. 5] 
A third complaint about the annual funding for military retirement benefits was 
the growing and alarming size of the unfunded liability associated with retirement benefit 
obligations already incurred. The FY82 estimate of the preexisting liability was $527 
billion [Ref 13: p. VII-20]. While the government carried such significant unfunded 
liabilities, it was only as recently as 1974 that Congress passed the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA required private corporations that carried pension 
plans to begin prefunding those plans. Additionally, it required that these firms 
determine their unfunded liabilities and amortize that obligation in order to achieve full 
funding in the future. [Ref 5: pp. 712-713, Ref 7: pp. 19-20] The magnitude ofthe 
unfunded military retirement liability coupled with seeming hypocrisy implied by the 
government's intergenerational retirement funding while requiring private corporations to 
prefund their pension plans created the impetus for reform. 
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1. Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund 
Due to the pressures outlined above and intent on achieving cost reductions, 
Congress directed the DoD to begin funding retirement costs in advance. The change 
required that accrual accounting concepts be utilized to prefund military retirement 
benefits. The change was actually mandated in Public Law 98-94, the FY84 DoD 
Authorization Act. Effective October 1, 1984, this act had three essential elements. 
First, it established the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund. Second, it 
required the DoD to utilize accrual accounting procedures to prefund military retirement. 
And finally, it directed that the unfunded liability associated with existing military 
retirement benefit obligations be determined and. an amortization schedule be developed 
to pay down this liability. [Ref 14: pp. 530-535] 
a. Establishing the Fund 
The 1984 Defense Authorization Act amended Title 10, United States Code. 
Chapter 74 was added, which establishes the Military Retirement Fund and states both 
the purpose and procedures for its implementation. 
There is established on the books of the Treasury a fund to be 
known as the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund 
(hereinafter in this chapter referred to as the "Fund"), which shall be 
administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Fund shall be used for 
the accumulation of funds in order to finance on an actuarially sound basis 
liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and 
survivor benefit programs. 
10 U.S.C. § 1461 
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Through this legislation Congress sought to come to grips with the burgeoning 
unfunded liability of military retirement and provide greater cost visibility and 
responsibility. With respect to function, the Military Retirement Fund was separated 
from the DoD and placed under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury. It was 
assigned to a budget subfunction under the income security function (600). [Ref. 7: p.26, 
Ref. 14: p. 46] While the Secretary of the Treasury manages the fund, a Defense 
Retirement Board of Actuaries was established to report to and advise the Secretary of 
Defense on the actuarial status ofthe fund. [Ref. 14: p. 531] 
Fiscally, the Military Retirement Fund is funded through three sources. These 
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funds are then used to pay retirees. First, the Secretary ofDefense is required to 
recognize and pay the fund for current service member retirement liabilities. Next, the 
unfunded liability is to be amortized and paid. To do this, the Secretary of the Treasury 
is required to make one transfer payment per year from the general treasury into the fund. 
Finally, fund surpluses are to be invested in government debt securities. Interest earned 
via these investments accrues to the MRF. [Ref. 14: pp.534-535] 
b. Accrual Accounting 
Accrual accounting is a method of recording costs and allocating monies to pay 
these costs as they are incurred. In the case of military retirement, it means that money 
to satisfy the future liability associated with the earned retirement benefit of those 
currently in service should be budgeted for and set aside as that liability is incurred. [Ref. 
11: p. 12] This is precisely what the MRF legislation in the FY85 Defense Authorization 
Bill stipulated. 
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The Secretary of Defense is tasked with paying the MRF as service members 
earn retirement benefits. Abandoning the previous pay as you go process, the legislation 
requires prefunding. The procedures set out in the bill require the Secretary ofDefense 
to determine two basic pay factors. These factors, called single level percentages of 
basic pay or normal cost percentages (NCP), are to be used to determine the level of 
funds required to satisfy the costs of retirement that accrue as a result of current service. 
The factors are applied to the basic pay account each month to determine the amount to 
be transferred to the MRF. One factor is applied to the active duty pay accounts and the 
second to the ready (drilling) reserve pay accounts. These calculations, based on the 
previous month's payroll, are done monthly and the funds are so transferred. [Ref 14: p. 
534] 
For budgeting purposes, the Secretary ofDefense utilizes estimates of the 
individual NCPs, but in macro budget data they are often represented as a single 
weighted value. For future years' budgeting, the NCP factors are applied to the annual 
budget request for basic pay to determine the anticipated budget obligation for earned 
retirement benefits. This total is summed in the overall Military Personnel request 
submitted with the annual defense budget request. 
For example, in 1985 the military basic payroll accounts totaled $33.5 billion. 
The single level percentage ofbasic pay in 1985 was 0.501. The product ofthe single 
·level percentage and the basic pay account yields an approximate budget request of 
$16.9 billion to prefund the military retirement obligations earned in that year [Ref 12: 
p.20]. Continuing this example and assuming the numbers above represent projections 
22 
for FY85, in his budget request for FY85, the Secretary of Defense would submit an 
aggregated Military Personnel payroll request of $50.4 billion to satisfy the basic pay and 
retirement accruals. The actual Military Personnel request was greater at approximately 
$67.324 billion [Ref 7: p. 27]. This difference represents other components of 
compensation included in the Military Personnel budget requests. Gone from the budget 
process for military retirement is the Retired Military Personnel account used in the pay 
as you go process. 
Table 2 below shows the actual basic pay account totals, the normal retirement 
costs associated with the basic pay level and the single percentage ofbasic pay factors 
used in determining the earned retirement benefits during the period from 1985 to 1994. 
Table 2 
Military Retirement Flow Relative to Basic Pay 
In Billions of Dollars 
Fiscal Year Basic Pay Retirement Costs %Basic Pay Factor 
1985 $33.5 $17.0 0.507 
1986 35.4 17.4 0.492 
1987 36.4 18.3 0.503 
1988 37.3 18.4 0.493 
1989 38.6 18.5 0.479 
1990 39.8 16.3 0.410 
1991 42.3 17.2 0.407 
1992 41.1 16.3 0.397 
1993 38.9 13.2 0.339 
1994 38.3 12.8 0.335 
Source: Valuation ofthe Military Retirement System 1994. 
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c. The Unfunded Liability 
The third key element the MRF legislation sought to address was the enormous 
unfunded liability associated with the benefits ofboth active and retired service earned 
prior to the MRF' s establishment. In 1982, when serious debate about this legislation 
began, the unfunded liability was estimated at $527 billion [Ref 13: p. VII-20]. When 
the legislation was passed, it gave the Defense Retirement Board of Actuaries six months 
to determine the present value ofthe unfunded liability. [Ref 14: p. 532]. Their 
determination was that the unfunded liability was $528.7 biilion in 1984. 
After determining the extent of the unfunded liability, the Board of Actuaries had 
to develop an amortization schedule to liquidate this obligation. The original repayment 
schedule they developed called for a 60-year amortization to repay this unfunded 
liability. [Ref 12: pp. 14, 24] Once the original schedule was established, the Secretary 
of the Treasury was tasked with transferring one payment annually to fulfill the 
amortization requirement. These funds are transferred at the beginning of each fiscal 
year from the general treasury to the MRF. [Ref 14: p. 534] 
While the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for making each annual 
amortization payment, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for maintaining an 
accurate valuation. Consequently, any changes to the retirement benefit structure or 
account valuation assumptions that require amortization changes must be accounted for. 
To accomplish this, the Secretary ofDefense reviews the account valuation annually. 
Based on this review, he certifies, to the Secretary of the Treasury, the amount that must 
be transferred from the treasury to the MRF. [Ref 14: pp. 531-535] 
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After ten years of payments, the accrued unfunded liability was $491.4 billion as 
of September 30, 1994. The current amortization schedule is projected to completely 
liquidate the unfunded liability by FY 2044. [Ref 12: pp . .13, 23, Ref 15: p. 47] 
C. PROCESS CHANGES AND FLOW OF FUNDS 
With the establishment ofthe MRF, certain budget process changes occurred. 
Under the old pay as you go funding, all appropriations for military retirement were 
annual appropriations. Now, the process for military retirement funding includes a mix 
of annual and permanent appropriations. With the establishment of the MRF, the 
Retired Military Personnel Account is no longer used. Instead, the DoD obligation for its 
accrual contribution to the MRF is included in the Military Personnel request within the 
DoD budget request. Technically it is included in budget subfunction 051 and budget 
function 050, national defense. Since the Military Personnel budget function includes the 
DoD contribution to the MRF, this is the portion of military retirement budgeting which 
remains an annual appropriation. 
The treasury transfer into the MRF to satisfy the unfunded liability amortization 
payment and any accrued interest on MRF surpluses is directed by Chapter 74, Title 10 
U.S.C. In this regard, this transfer represents a permanent appropriation in that an annual 
appropriation is not required to effect this transfer. [Ref 7: p. 41] 
Finally, since eligibility for retirement benefits is governed by statute, and Title 
10 requires that the MRF assets be "made available for payments" to retirees, payments 
from the fund also behave like permanent appropriations. Figure 2 depicts the flow of 
funds into and out of the MRF. 
25 




















Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System 1994. 
1. Effects and Benefits of Accrual Accounting 
-.1-~1 
The pursuit of actuarially sound principles and the switch to accrual accounting 
seem to have offered budgetary improvements over the pay as you go system. They have 
provided an added measure of cost visibility, particularly with respect to the unfunded 
liability and the impact of changes to retirement benefits. But more importantly, they 
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have provided Congress with a tool to achieve immediate cost reductions associated with 
changes to military retirement benefits. Under the pay as you go system, changes to 
retirement benefits (if grandfathered) would not result in reduced retirement outlays until 
those service members retired. With accrual accounting prefunding, savings associated 
with benefit reductions can be achieved within a month of enactment. 
A simple comparison of the NCPs among the various retirement benefit systems 
currently in effect illustrates these effects. Table 3 lists the NCPs for FY95. These are 
the percentages to be applied to the basic pay account to determine the retirement accrual 
liability during FY95. 
Table 3 
Normal Cost Percentages FY 95 
Full Time Reserve - Part Time 
Current System 39.3 10.7 
High- 3 35.0 10.0 
Redux 29.7 9.1 
Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System 1994. 
Under pay as you go, the retirement benefit reduction associated with the Redux system 
would not yield cost savings until FY 2006. With the MRF and accrual accounting, the 
savings were available in FY 1987. The Secretary ofDefense, based on the percentages 
indicated above, has to transfer fewer funds each month to fulfill the prefunding 
obligation for service members covered by the Redux plan than those covered by the 
other plans. Accrual accounting, therefore, has yielded an immediate cost savings as the 
result of benefit change initiatives. 
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Certainly, the immediacy of savings impacts was not lost on Congress. Shortly 
after establishing the MRF, the first major change in military retirement benefits in nearly 
forty years was enacted with the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (Redux). Since 
this period, military pension benefits have come under increasing scrutiny as a potential 
source of cost savings. One facet of this attention has been the retirement benefit COLA. 
The 1 03rd Congress, in an attempt to achieve deficit reduction, looked to both the 
military and federal civil service COLAs for savings. Chapter IV describes the 
contribution COLAs made toward deficit reduction and the legislative activity necessary 
to achieve these changes. 
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IV. RETIREMENT ADJUSTMENT BY THE 103RD CONGRESS 
The climate surrounding the 1 03 rd Congress in 1993 was one of heightened fiscal 
sensitivity about the enormous size and growth trends of both the budget deficits and the 
overall national debt. A number of measures, both revenue generating and deficit 
reducing, were introduced to gain control over the deficit. One legislative contribution 
to deficit reduction involved the COLAs paid to military and federal civil service retirees. 
The 103rd Congress, through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 
of 1993 ), sought to achieve a measure of deficit reduction by delaying the COLAs paid 
to retirees, both military and federal civil service, during each of the years from 1994 to 
1998. The process involved many variations and compromises in the legislative language 
which eventually lead to the final legislation. 
This chapter examines the various proposals that were made as the congressional 
process progressed. The focus is on the military retirement COLA. While a separate 
matter, occasional reference to the federal civil service retiree COLA is made. This 
COLA enjoyed shorter delays over fewer years than the military COLA, creating an 
equity issue that surfaces in later debates. To help frame the debate and congressional 
action associated with the OBRA of 1993 as it relates to military COLAs, a historical 
summary of COLAs and their application is helpful. 
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A. COLABACKGROUND 
1. Pre-COLA Retirement Pay Increases 
Prior to the COLAs now in place, the principle of recomputation was utilized to 
index military retiree pay. Recomputation simply retains the active duty pay scale as the 
basis for retiree pay. As active duty pay increased, retiree pay increased. The retiree pay 
was based directly on the active pay scale. This process began with the Army and Navy 
Appropriation Acts of 1871. [Ref 5: p.491] 
The pay of all officers of the navy now on or hereafter placed on 
the retired list was to be based on the highest pay prescribed by this act for 
officers on the active list whose grade corresponds to the grade held by 
such retired officers. 
The quote reflecting the link between retiree pay and active pay is slightly 
misleading. The active pay scale provided the basis for retiree pay. Retirees received a 
percentage of active pay based on years of service or degree of disability. But the 
important link between the two was established and remained in effect with minor 
adjustments until1958. [Ref 5: pp. 491-494] 
During the period between 1871 and 1958, active duty military pay, and therefore 
retiree pay, was increased at irregular intervals. In the years immediately preceding the 
Armed Forces Pay Act of 1958, military pay was increased in 1952 and 1955. During 
congressional debate over the Armed Forces Pay Act of 1958, the practice of 
recomputation came into question. If recomputation was permitted based on the 
anticipated active pay raise in 1958, the cost was projected to be $65 million. Ifinstead, 
the retiree pay was increased by six percent and not recomputed based on the active pay 
raise, the projected cost was $35 million. Congress elected to forgo recomputation and 
30 
increased the retiree pay by 6 percent. The active duty pay increase was 8.3 percent 
that year. [Ref 5: p. 493, Ref 12: pp. 5, 8] This is the first instance of separating the 
link between active and retired pay increases as well as establishing an increase 
differential between the two. What the act did not do is make the process permanent. 
2. Consumer Price Index Adjustments to Retiree Pay 
Continuing the irregular schedule of military pay raises, the next pay increase 
legislation occurred in 1963, and again, recomputation was questioned. This time, the 
link between retiree pay and active duty pay was severed permanently. The Uniformed 
Services Pay Act of 1963 eliminated the recomputation process and replaced it with a 
permanent system for adjusting retired pay. The. new system called for increasing retiree 
pay to compensate for cost of living increases as reflected by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). [Ref 12: p. B-5] This new, permanent system marks the beginning of the COLA 
based retiree pay increases currently practiced. 
The rational for change then, as it was in 1993, remained cost reduction. 
The Committee on Armed Services recognizes the tradition that 
has attached itself in the past to the method of recomputing retired pay 
whenever the rates of basic pay for members on active duty are changed. 
It was not easy in 1958, and it is not easy now, to recommend this break 
with tradition. Nevertheless, the break with tradition was made in 1958 
when recomputation of retired pay based on changes in active duty pay 
rates was not authorized. 
The Committee on Armed Services fully realizes the obligation we 
have to those now retired who have served their Nation. But the 
committee also recognizes its obligation to those now serving on active 
duty and those who will enter on active duty in the future. 
The committee cannot disregard the already heavy costs involved 
in military retirement or the substantial added costs which would result if 
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recomputation were to be retained as a part of the military retirement 
system. [Ref. 16: p. 19] 
Interestingly, the active duty pay raise in 1963 was 14.2 percent while the COLA for 
retirees was only 5.0 percent. [Ref. 12: pp. B-7-B-8] 
The CPI procedure as outlined in The Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963 called 
for measuring the CPI in January of each year. This CPI was then compared to the 
annual average of the CPI for the preceding year. If the CPI increase was 3 percent or 
greater, retiree pay would be increased. The increase would be effective on April first of 
that year. [Ref. 5: p.494] While there was a COLA in 1963, it was paid on October 1, 
1963 and was not awarded under this legislation. Before any COLAs were paid under 
this procedure, it was modified. The Armed Services Pay Act of 1965 (PL 89-132), 
passed on August 21, 1965, changed the indexing. mechanism. 
The new procedure called for comparing monthly CPI growth against the CPI 
base index used in the last COLA computation. When the monthly CPI rose 3 percent 
above the base index and remained at that level, or above, for 3 consecutive months, 
retired pay would be indexed. The amount of increase would be the highest increase 
experienced in that 3-consecutive-month series. The COLA increase would take effect 
on the first day of the third month following the 3-consecutive-month series of3 or 
greater percent increases in the CPl. [Ref. 5: p. 494] 
The following is an example to illustrate this process. Suppose the CPI base 
index after the October 1, 1963 COLA was $100.00. Then, the first period of3 
consecutive monthly CPis that were 3 percent or greater occurred in April, May and 
June of 1965, and the CPis for those months were $103.00, $103.60 and $104.40, 
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respectively. This example satisfies the requirement for consecutive CPis exceeding the 
3 percent threshold. Therefore, a COLA would be paid on September 1, 1965. The 
COLA percent will be the highest of the 3 consecutive monthly CPis. In this case, 4.4 
percent. The new CPI base index will become $104.40. Conceivably, in periods of high 
inflation, this procedure could lead to multiple COLAs in any given year. Actually, 
multiple COLAs in one year were paid two times before this system was again changed. 
These occurred in 1974 and 1975 when two COLA increases were awarded in each of 
those years. [Ref 12: p. B-7] 
In 1969 the indexing procedure was modified once again. Surprisingly, this 
change increased the COLA benefit. PL 91-179 left the basic tenets described above 
intact. However, it added what has sometimes been called the 1-percent-kicker. The new 
procedure required that when the CPI increase thresholds were satisfied and a COLA was 
to be awarded, 1 percentage point was added to the COLA. The rationale for the increase 
was to compensate retirees for the delay between the CPI increase and the actual increase 
in pay. Continuing the illustrative example above, under the new law, the 4.4 percent 
COLA would be increased to 5.4 percent. The 1 percent addition was also included in 
the federal civil service retirement program via separate legislation. The legislation 
which included the civil service addition predated the military COLA increase by 2 
months. [Ref 5: p. 494] 
The procedures established in 1965 and modified in 1969 continued until1976 
(FY 77). These new changes marked the beginning of what seems to be a period of 
continuous COLA attention by Congress. In 1976, with the DoD Appropriation 
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Authorization Act of 1977, the !-percent-kicker was eliminated. Actually, the 
elimination of the addition was contingent upon a similar reversal of the civil service 
COLA addition. Both COLA programs lost the 1 percent addition. [Ref 5: p.494] 
After the 1 percent increase, originally designed to compensate for pay increase 
delays, was eliminated, Congress again changed the COLA system. Via separate 
legislation in 1977, the COLA adjustment procedures were changed yet again. The 
Legislative Branch Appropriation Act of 1977 (PL 94-440) stipulated that the COLA 
adjustment be made twice yearly. The semiannual adjustments were to be made on 
March 1st and September 1st of each year. The increase was based on the CPI rise 
between June and December for the March 1st i~crease, and January to June for the 
September 1st increase. [Ref 12: p. B-5, Ref 5: p. 494] 
Considering the high and prolonged inflationary character of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, one aspect of the COLA adjustment mechanism change that received little 
attention was the elimination of the 3 percent CPI increase threshold. The Legislative 
Branch Appropriation Act of 1977 (PL 94-440) did not continue this requirement as 
evidenced by the March 1, 1978 COLA increase of only 2.4 percent. [Ref 12: pp. B-5-7] 
The next change to the COLA mechanics occurred in 1980. The DoD 
Authorization Act of 1981 (PL 96-342) switched the semi-annual adjustment to an annual 
one. The September adjustment was eliminated and the basis for the increase became the 
December to December rise in the CPl. The COLA effective date became March 1st. 
This increase was both identical and coincident with the civil service retirement COLA. 
[Ref 12: p. B-5, Ref 5: p. 494] 
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Eliminating the I percentage point addition to the military retiree COLA saved 
approximately $I40 million during the first year and almost $2.5 billion through I983. 
Additionally, by switching to the annual, vice semi-annual adjustments, the compounding 
effect of multiple annual increases was eliminated. This generated additional savings. 
The I984 estimate ofthese savings was $I70 million. [Ref I7: p. 38] 
Between I982 and I984 several measures were introduced that reduced the 
COLA benefits. During fiscal years I983-I985, based on projections of inflation at 
greater than 6.6 percent, a partial or half-COLA limitation was instituted for non-
disability retirees under 62 years of age. The half-COLA mechanism required that if 
inflation was high during the period from I983-85, the COLA would be one half of the 
CPI increase, but not lower that 3.3 percent. Next, the OBRA of I982 delayed the 
effective dates on which each of the COLAs were to be paid from March in each year to 
Aprili983, May I984 and June I985. Actual inflation during this period was moderate, 
so the half-COLA triggers were not particularly painful for retirees. The CPI increase in 
I983 was 3.9 percent. The I983 COLA was 3.9 percent for retirees over 62, disabled 
retirees and survivors while the non-disabled retirees under age 62 received 3.3 percent. 
[Ref I7: p. 39, Ref I8: p. I] The half-COLA procedure for non-disabled retirees under 
age 62 was quickly repealed by the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act for FY I984 
(PL 98-396). This restored comparable COLA calculation procedures to all retirees. 
[Ref I8: p. 3] 
The next legislative COLA attention occurred in I984. The President's budget 
submission included several provisions related to the military COLA. The 
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recommendations included repealing the OBRA 1982 measures requiring COLA delays 
from March to May 1984 and June 1985, and also repealing the half-COLA calculation 
for non-disabled retirees under age 62. Instead, the administration recommended 
permanently changing the effective COLA date to January 1st of each year beginning 
with January 1, 1985. Additionally, the administration recommended changing the 
COLA computation procedure. Instead of the December to December rise in CPI, the 
new method determined the COLA by measuring the change in the average CPI between 
third quarters in successive years. That is, the CPI during each of the months from June 
to September in one year would be averaged and then compared to the average CPI for 
the same months in the following year. The change between these averages would 
determine the COLA. [Ref 18: pp. 2-3] 
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1983 (PL 98-270), passed on April18, 1984, 
included these recommendations and made them law. This essentially reversed the 
OBRA of 1982, and in so doing eliminated the COLA in 1984. The next COLA of3.5 
percent was paid on January 1, 1985. The previous COLA had been on Aprill, 1983. 
[Ref 12: p. B-7, Ref 18: p. 3] 
The next scheduled COLA was to be paid on January 1, 1986. The President's 
budget submission in 1985 (FY 86) recommended eliminating this adjustment altogether 
and resuming COLAs with the January 1987 increase. Both the Senate and the House, 
via the final Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, rejected the President's proposal and 
voted to maintain the scheduled COLA. Also in 1985, the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings or GRH) was passed. 
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Provisions in this law temporarily, and later permanently, suspended the FY 1986 COLA. 
[Ref 18: p. 3] 
In 1986, President Reagan, in his FY 1987 DoD Budget request, again 
recommended eliminating the annual COLA. Again, the House and Senate rejected these 
proposals. This time however, the Congress went further. The OBRA of 1986 included 
the requirement for full COLA payments between 1987 and 1991 even if Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings sequestrations were stipulated. Later Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
amendments (PL 100-119, September 29, 1987) excluded military retirement COLAs 
from the sequestration process. [Ref 18: p. 5] For the remainder of the Reagan 
administration, the military retiree COLA remained unchanged. 
The incoming Bush administration resumed the COLA assault reminiscent of the 
early Reagan administration. In his budget submissions for both FY 1990 and FY 1991, 
President Bush first proposed eliminating the January COLAs in both 1990 and 1991. 
Next he recommended adopting the CPI minus 1 percentage point COLA calculation for 
all military retirees. (CPI-1 is the COLA calculation procedure already applicable to 
certain military members under the Redux military retirement system described in 
Chapter II) These recommendations were later dropped after Congress and the President 
reached a budget agreement. [Ref 18: p. 5] COLAs of 4.7 percent and 5.4 percent, 
respectively, were paid on both January 1, 1990 and January 1, 1991. The procedure 
utilized compared the average CPI increases between the third quarters in each of the 
years preceding the COLA. [Ref 12: p. B-7] 
The previous discussion illustrates the role COLAs have played in budget debates 
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since their institution and the repeal of the recomputation procedure. This debate 
continued with the 103rd. Congress. The table below captures the history of COLAs 
since the tie between active duty and retired pay was broken. 
Table 4 
Military Retired COLAs, 1958-1995 
Date COLA(%) Date COLA(%) 
6/1/58 6.0 9/1/78 4.9 
10/1/63 5.0 3/1/79 3.9 
9/1165 4.4 9/1/79 6.9 
12/1/66 3.7 3/1/80 6.0 
4/1168 3.9 9/1/80 7.7 
2/1169 4.0 3/1/81 4.4 
11/1/69 5.3 3/1/82 8.7 
8/1/70 5.6 4/1/83 3.9/3.3 
6/1/71 4.5 111/85 3.5 
7/1172 4.8 1/1/86 0.0 
7/1/73 6.1 1/1/87 1.3 
1/1/74 5.5 1/1188 4.2 
7/1/74 6.3 1/1189 4.0 
1/1/75 7.3 1/1/90 4.7 
8/1/75 5.1 1/1191 5.4 
3/1176 5.4 111192 3.7 
3/1177 4.8 111/93 3.0 
9/1/77 4.3 4/1194 2.6 
3/1/78 2.4 4/1/95 2.8 
Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement 1994. 
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B. Mll..ITARY COLAS AND THE 103RD CONGRESS 
In 1993, during the FY 1994 budget debate, both the military and federal civil 
service COLAs came under scrutiny again. The end result was the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993. The OBRA of 1993 made no substantive changes to the 
COLA calculation procedures or eligibility requirements. Rather, it shifted the effective 
dates on which each of the COLAs, military and civil service, would be paid. The shift 
was from January first to various dates through the years 1994 to 1999. This was the first 
such split since 1969. An important distinction is that OBRA 1993 delayed the dates 
differently for military and civil service COLAs during those years, creating what many 
saw as an unacceptable inequity. How Congress arrived at this legislation is important 
in explaining how the disparity in COLAs occurred. 
1. The Budget Resolution 
The President's Budget submis~ion in 1993 for FY 1994 contained no provisions 
or restrictions associated with the military retiree COLA. The House, however, in 
developing the budget resolution, included COLA adjustments as part of its package of 
deficit reduction. The House ofRepresentatives Concurrent Resolution on the Budget 
called for changes in legislation from the Committee on the Armed Services to achieve 
savings of$186 million in FY 1994 and total savings during FYs 1994-1998 of$3.940 
billion. [Ref 19: p. 261] The Budget Committee certainly recognized that the committee 
with jurisdiction was free to achieve these targets in a manner they felt appropriate, but 
based these targets on certain legislative assumptions. 
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The Budget Committee's assumptions about the COLA adjustments included the 
following provisions. All military retiree COLA increases would be capped at $400 for 
FY 1994 and the COLA would be paid on January 1, 1994. For retirees under age 62, the 
COLA calculation would be 50 percent ofthe CPI increase. Upon reaching 62 years old, 
there would be a one time increase or catch-up in retired pay to restore the purchasing 
power lost to the half-COLA. This change would be permanent. Finally, for current 
retirees over age 62, the COLA would be computed based on the CPI change minus 1 
percent. This was not to be a permanent change and would apply only in FY s 1995-
1997. [Ref 20: p.51, Ref 18: p. 8] 
The Senate Concurrent Resolution on the Budget directed the Senate Committee 
on the Armed Services to report changes in authorization legislation which resulted in no 
reductions in outlays in either FY1994 or the period FY 1994-1998. [Ref 21: p. 47] 
At the Budget Resolution Conference, the deficit reduction targets were reduced 
somewhat. The Budget Conference Report required the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees to report legislative changes that achieved savings of$128 million 
in FY 1994 with total deficit reduction savings of$2.361 billion for FYs 1994-1998. 
[Ref 21: pp.1, 17-18] 
The underlying policy assumptions in the Conference on the Budget Resolution 
about how these targets were to be met were directed primarily at retirees under age 62. 
The $400 cap would only apply to retirees under age 62 and only in FY 1994. The 
COLA would be paid on January 1, 1994 and the 50 percent ofCPI calculation for 
retirees under 62 would become permanent. The one time COLA increase at age 62 was 
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included as well. This half-COLA with the catch-up at age 62 is exactly the same as the 
House budget proposal. [Ref 18: pp. 9-10] 
The changes in these assumptions were the result of conference compromises. 
The conferees agreed to narrow the scope of the COLA adjustments to those under age 
62 only, while reducing the savings target from the House's original $3.940 billion to 
$2.361 billion during FYs 1994-1998. [Ref 19: p. 261, Ref 20: pp. 17-18, Ref 21: p. 
106] 
2. Armed Services Committee Action 
Both the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees, under the new 
instructions from the Budget Resolution Conference, began deliberation to achieve the 
directed deficit reduction targets. In both the Senate and the House, the underlying 
assumptions to reduce COLAs for those under age 62 were rejected. Instead, each 
committee reported legislation that delayed COLAs vice reducing them. 
The Senate Armed Service Committee reluctantly proposed the following COLA 
delays. The January 1st COLAs in FYs 1994 through 1997 would be delayed for 9 
months and would be paid on October 1st. In FY 1998, the COLA would be delayed 8 
months and would be paid on September 1st. Thereafter, the COLA would return to the 
January 1st payment schedule. In each case, the COLA would be a full COLA. There 
would be no reduction in the COLA computation procedure. Finally, the COLA that 
applies to disabled retirees and survivors would not be delayed. These recipients would 
receive their COLA increases on January 1st of each FY. [Ref. 23: pp. 52-54] 
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In delivering their report, the Senate Armed Services Committee leadership 
expressed their concern about both the seemingly disproportionate contribution to deficit 
reduction the DoD has had to bear, and the equity issue associated with delaying military 
retiree COLAs longer than those of other federal retirees. 
The Committee makes these recommendations reluctantly. In 
recent years, the defense budget has made a greater contribution to deficit 
reduction than any other part of the budget. Indeed, defense savings 
represent virtually the only deficit reduction in the Budget Enforcement 
Act of 1990 that have actually been delivered. 
In this case, the Committee had no alternative to reducing military 
retirement benefits in achieving its required savings, since military 
retirement constitutes 99 percent of the Armed Services Committee's 
direct spending allocation under the Budget resolution. 
The members of the Armed Services Committee are concerned that 
the required reductions in military retirement spending will result in 
greater COLA delays for military retirees than for other federal retirees. 
COLA equity should be a basic principle and we urge the full Senate and 
the conferees on the Reconciliation Bill to take this into consideration. 
[Ref 23: p. 54] 
The House Armed Services Committee similarly rejected the COLA reductions 
for retirees under age 62. The Committee felt the age distinction was inequitable. 
Instead, they too elected to delay the COLA application dates. The Committee 
recommendation called for a variable delay in the COLA application dates. This has also 
been referred to as a "rolling COLA." The provisions called for paying a full COLA in 
each year from FY 1994 to FY 1999. But the COLA effective date would be delayed 4 
months in FY 1994 and three additional months in each succeeding FY. Specifically, the 
COLA delays would be: 
1. Delay FY 1994 COLA from January 1, 1994, until May 1, 1994. 
2. Delay FY 1995 COLA form May 1, 1995, until August 1, 1995. 
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3. Delay FY 1996 COLA form August 1, 1996, until November 1, 1996. 
4. Delay FY 1997 COLA from November 1, 1997, until February 1, 1998. 
5. Delay FY 1998 COLA from February 1, 1999, to May 1, 1999. 
Similar to the Senate version, dis~bled retirees and survivors would continue to receive 
their COLAs on January 1st of each year. [Ref 24: pp. 72-73] Congressional Budget 
Office estimates projected savings associated with these rolling delays to be $214 million 
in FY 1994 and $2.339 billion between FY 1994 and FY 1998. [Ref 24: p.75] 
3. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 
Approaching the conference on the OBRA of 1993, the House and Senate had 
similar proposals in that they both sought to achieve the deficit reduction targets via 
COLA delays. Votes in both the House and the. Senate on their respective Reconciliation 
Bills retained the proposals oftheir Armed Services Committees. [Ref 7: 51-52] There 
seemed to be agreement between both Armed Services Committees and various interest 
groups that if military retiree pay had to provide some deficit reduction, delaying the 
COLA was the least objectionable means of doing so. Between the alternatives, the 
rolling COLA proposal from the House was less desirable. The Senate version, a 9 
month delay in each of the following five years seemed simpler and was favored by the 
various parties who testified during committee hearings. [Ref 25: pp. 4-5] 
The Budget Reconciliation conference convened between July 15 and August 2, 
1993. Once the bill came out of conference, the House and Senate considered the 
conference report. The House passed the bill on August 5th, on a vote of218-216. The 
Senate considered the measure on August 6th. The Reconciliation bill passed 51-50 with 
the Vice President casting the tie-breaking vote. President Clinton signed the 
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reconciliation bill into law (PL 103-66) on August 10, 1993. [Ref 22: p. 108, Ref 26: p. 
1] The OBRA of 1993 was to reduce the federal deficit by $504.8 billion in fiscal 1994-
1998, with $250.1 billion accruing from tax increases and $254.7 from spending cuts. A 
fraction of those cuts--$2.4 billion, or less than 1 percent--came from delayed military 
retiree COLAs. [Ref 22: p. 124] 
The COLA changes in the Reconciliation Bill were a compromise between the 
House and Senate versions. The final legislation delayed non-disabled military retiree 
COLAs in each FY from 1994 through 1998. The FY 1994 COLA would be delayed 4 
months and would be paid on April 1, 1994. Thereafter, the COLAs would be delayed 9 
months and would be paid on October 1st in FYs 1995-1998. [Ref 22: p. 129] COLAs 
for disabled retirees and survivors were exempt from the scheduled delays and would 
continue to be paid on January 1st of each FY. 
The deficit reduction contribution from these delays was estimated to be $180 
million in FY 1994 and $2.358 billion in fiscal1994-1998. [Ref 18: p. 16] Interestingly, 
the OBRA of 1993 also changed the effective dates of the federal civil service retiree 
COLAs to achieve a contribution to deficit reduction. However, the dates were changed 
differently than those of military retirees. The civil service retiree COLA was delayed 
from January 1st to March 1st in FY 1994, 1995 and 1996 only. This was a 3 month 
delay for only 3 years. This created the perception of inequity which the Senate Armed 
Services Committee cautioned against. This issue surfaces again in the COLA debates 
that follow the OBRA of 1993. 
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COLAs, as evidenced by their history since incorporation in 1958, have been used 
regularly as a means of cost savings. Typically however, the adjustments have been 
made uniformly through both the federal civil service and military retirement plans. The 
principle of COLA equity between the retirement benefit plans has been both a basis and 
condition for many changes. With the OBRA of 1993, this equity principle was 
breached. This becomes an important consideration in military retiree compensation and 
budgeting in the following years. The next chapter explores some ofthe ramifications 
and changes that result from the dissimilar COLA delays. 
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V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 103RD CONGRESSIONAL ADJUSTMENTS 
In 1995 and 1996, under pressure associated with the inequity between the federal 
civil service and military COLA delays resulting from OBRA of 1993, Congress moved 
to reverse the disparity. Since both the military and federal retirees received their 
COLAs on the same date in 1994, the inequity issue gained importance in the FY 1995 
budget debate and continued through FY 1996. Legislation in each year moved the 
military COLA application date to coincide with the federal civil service COLA date. 
Like the budget process in 1993, the legislative adjustments to reverse the OBRA of 1993 
are important in understanding the current military retirement circumstance and the role 
military retirement has played in recent deficit reduction activity. 
A. THE COLA EQUITY PRINCIPLE 
Congress treated federal civil service retirement and military retirement programs 
equally with respect to COLAs since 1963. By that time, both retirement programs had 
automatic periodic inflation adjustments based on CPI increases. When one program was 
changed, the other was typically changed in the same manner. [Ref 26: p. 3] One 
example of this parity was the addition of the 1-percent-kicker to the COLAs ofboth 
programs in 1969. [Ref 5: p. 494] In 1973, automatic inflation adjustments were 
extended to Social Security benefits as well (PL 93-66, PL 93-233). The military and 
civil service COLAS were identical through most years since their inception and 
specifically identical since 1969. Social Security COLA increases were also comparable 
once automatic increases took effect. Therefore, by 1973 there was an expectation that 
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equity among all three programs would be observed. By 1984, the mechanism and timing 
of COLA increases became the same for all three programs. [Ref. 26: p. 4] 
With the OBRA of 1983, military retirees, civil service retirees and Social 
Security recipients were to receive the same COLAs at the same time. In 1985, due to 
GRH sequestration requirements, both the military and civil service retirement programs 
had that year's COLA canceled. However, Social Security recipients were exempt from 
the sequestration and received a COLA of 3.1 percent. This is the first breach between 
Social Security and the others but it's important to note that military and civil service 
retirees were treated the same, reinforcing the equity principle. The military and civil 
service retirement COLAs remained consistent until the OBRA of 1993. This was the 
second breach. [Ref. 27: p. 4] Consequently, there has been a principle, whether practical 
or legislative, of equity between the federal civil service retirement and military 
retirement with respect to COLAs. To a lesser extent, Social Security has also been 
aligned on an equity basis as well. 
Numerous groups expressed their concern regarding the break with the equity 
principle during the legislative debate in 1994. Senator Sarbanes captured the issue well 
during the FY 1995 Defense Authorization Bill floor debate. 
What happened in last year's budget process is that we severed a 
linkage between civilian and military COLA's which has existed for the 
past 25 years. Since 1969, military and Federal civilian retirees have 
received an identical COLA on the same date. With military recruitment 
in decline, career stability affected by force drawdown, and even more 
intense operational requirements on the remaining forces, I think it is very 
important that we not send the message that military retirees will receive 
disparate and unequal treatment. .. .it really comes down to honoring 
commitments that have already been made. 
[Ref. 28: p. S. 8076] 
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Senator Sarbanes reiterated a key element of the military retiree outcry about the COLA 
delay. Simply, the military retirees did not resent the sacrifice related to the delayed 
COLAs. What they thought unfair was the unequal treatment relative to the federal 
civilian retirees. [Ref 28: p. S. 8076] 
This became the context of the legislative debate as Congress began to redress 
this issue. 
B. POST OBRA 1993 COLA LEGISLATION 
1. Fiscal Year 1995 
The COLA disparity was not addressed in the President's budget submission for 
FY 1995 nor were any COLA provisions included in the Congressional Budget 
Resolution. [Ref 18: pp. 12-13] The debate began in the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees. 
First, the House Armed Services Committee approved its version of the FY 1995 
Defense Authorization Bill on May 5, 1994. This version ofthe bill moved the date of 
the military COLA to coincide with the civil service COLA of April1, 1995. This was a 
one year shift only. It did not move the COLA application dates in the later years 
addressed by the OBRA of 1993. It authorized $376 million to fund the COLA date 
shift. A corresponding appropriation was still required to actually make the earlier 
payment possible. Finally, the committee included legislative language indicating that 
they would work to find a solution to the remaining COLA delays in the out years. The 
full House considered and passed the bill on June 9th. [Ref 29: p. 422, Ref 18: p. 13] 
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The Senate also considered the COLA disparity. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee reached a similar conclusion to that of the House. They agreed that the 
inequity should be reversed, but their approach was slightly different. In developing 
their Defense Authorization report to the Senate, the Senate Armed Services committee 
considered three alternatives. [Ref 30: pp. 197-199] 
First, they considered the House alternative of simply moving the military COLA 
to April 1st and authorizing the funds to pay for this move. This alternative was 
unpopular for several reasons. The $376 million to pay for this shift would have to be 
appropriated out of the discretionary defense budget for FY 1995. This created a 
dangerous and, as some Senators viewed it, unacceptable precedent of diverting 
discretionary funds to pay for an entitlement. The second objection raised was related to 
rules prohibiting such a funds shift. It was noted that by increasing the COLA (the date 
shift results in an increase) without paying for it by a corresponding reduction in another 
entitlement the P A YGO (pay-as-you-go) provision of the Budget Enforcement act was 
violated. PA YGO requires that increases in one entitlement are paid for via offsetting 
reductions in another entitlement so that the net effect is deficit neutral. [Ref 30: pp. 
197-199] 
The second alternative the committee considered involved delaying the civil 
service COLA further in order to advance the military retirement COLA. Both dates 
would be shifted to the same date. This approach achieved payment date equity not only 
in 1995 but could also be continued in the out years. The proposal delayed the civil 
service date and advanced the military date 3 months to July in both 1995 and 1996 and 
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various other dates through 1998. This alternative offered advantages the earlier one did 
not. It maintained the P A YGO principle, it was deficit neutral, and it did not burden the 
already beleaguered defense budget. The difficulty was that delaying the civil service 
COLA date was outside the Armed Services Committee's jurisdiction and would require 
Senate action to implement. A second concern was that this dual shift in COLA dates 
would create a rivalrous environment between benefit recipients. [Ref 29: pp.l98-199, 
Ref 30: S. 8075-8081] 
The third alternative considered by the Armed Services Committee was to simply 
advance the military COLA date to coincide with the civil service COLA date and add 
the cost to the deficit. This too seemed to violate the P A YGO requirements stipulated in 
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. [Ref 30. pp. 198-199] 
The Senate Armed Service~ Committee considered and passed their Authorization 
bill on June 9th by a vote of 19-3. The committee chose the second alternative and 
elected to delay the civil service COLA and advance the military COLA to the same date. 
Since the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over the civil service 
retirement, the Senate Armed Services Committee did not include statutory language to 
change the civil service retirement COLA Instead, the Committee proposed to offer an 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Bill during full Senate consideration 
of that bill. Before that occurred, Senator Warner of Virginia offered a different 
amendment (No. 2143 to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995) to 
redress the COLA inequity. Serious debate ensued. [Ref 18: p. 13, Ref. 29: p. S. 8075] 
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Senators Warner and Sarbanes coauthored the Warner Amendment, which sought 
to reverse the Senate Armed Services Committee proposal. The Warner Amendment was 
essentially identical to the House Authorization bill. The Warner Amendment called for 
advancing the military COLA to April1, 1995 and authorizing the $376 million for pay 
for this increase. Like the House version, the money would still have to be appropriated 
to make this legislation effective and the COLA increase would have to come from 
reductions in other defense programs. [Ref 31: p. 1813, Ref 28: p. S. 8075] 
The Senate debate surrounding the Warner Amendment captures many of the key 
arguments, both pro and con, surrounding the COLA shift and COLA equity issues. 
The proponents of the Warner Amendment, such as Senators Warner, Sarbanes, 
Glen, Roth and numerous interest groups, argued that equity for military retirees and the 
importance of the credibility signal it sends to current and future service members was 
more important than the fiscal consequences of shifting the date. The $376 million out of 
an approximate $270 billion in projected defense outlays for FY 1995 did not seem 
unreasonable. The COLAs for both groups had already been delayed and so the 
argument was only about reducing the extent of the delay for the military. Senator 
Sarbanes argued that this was already a compounded assault on retiree purchasing power 
since COLAs are retrospective, that is, the inflation has already occurred for up to 15 
months before the COLA is applied. Therefore retirees continually lose purchasing 
power to inflation, despite the COLA. 
The final argument in favor of the Warner amendment was presented in rejecting 
the Senate Armed Services Committee proposal to delay civil service COLAs in order to 
52 
advance the military COLA. The senators felt this would set a divisive precedent pitting 
one benefit recipient group against another. Both the military and civil service support 
organizations opposed this proposal as did the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs (the committee with jurisdiction over civil service compensation). [Ref 28: pp. 
S. 8075-8087] 
The key opponents of the Warner Amendment included the Administration, 
Senators Nunn, Inouye and Byrd. They eloquently argued against the Warner 
Amendment for several reasons. First, they felt the bill set a dangerous precedent of 
funding an entitlement by "robbing" a discretionary account. This, they continued, 
would significantly undermine the P A YGO principle and in this case, further reduce the 
defense discretionary accounts. Senator Nunn argued that, depending on which defense 
accounts were reduced, the consequences could be much larger than $376 million. 
Because ofthe long spend-out rates in various accounts, to achieve $376 million in 
savings might ultimately cost significantly more. Senator Nunn suggested that to achieve 
$376 million in savings would require a $500 million reduction in Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M), an $800 million reduction in Research and Development (R&D), 
or depending on which procurement account might be used as an offset, the cost could be 
billions. Finally, the opponents of the Warner Amendment argued that the ultimate result 
would be a shift of all the military COLA related deficit reduction of the OBRA of 1993 
to the discretionary defense account. [Ref 28: pp. S. 8077-8086] 
In the end, the arguments juxtaposed equity and the fiscal need to protect 
discretionary defense spending. The Senate voted 88-12 on July 1, 1994 in favor ofthe 
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Warner Amendment. The Defense authorization bill moved to the Conference 
Committee. 
The Conference Committee considered and reported the Defense Authorization 
legislation on August 12th. The committee adopted the House and Senate language that 
shifted the military COLA date to the civil service date and authorized the requisite 
funds. Their language included an admonishment against the use of discretionary funds 
to pay for an entitlement and a recommendation that an alternative be found to fund 
COLA disparity corrections in 1996-1998. Finally, the conference report included a 
Sense of the Congress statement that the effective dates of military and civil service 
COLAs should be the same. [Ref 18: p. 14, Ref 32: pp. 127-128] The House approved 
the conference report (H. R. 103-701) on August 17th by a 280-137 vote. The Senate 
passed it on September 13th by an 80-18 vote. The President signed the Defense 
Authorization Bill on October 5th, which then became PL 103-337. [Ref 29: pp. 421, 
425-428] 
With PL 103-337, advancing the military COLA effective date successfully 
passed the authorization process. However, without the requisite funding, the actual 
payment could not be effected. Funding the shift is within the jurisdiction of the House 
and Senate Appropriations Committees. 
The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee agreed to the intent and 
principle of advancing the COLA date for military retirees but did not specifically 
appropriate the required $376 million. Instead they argued that the Defense Military 
Retirement Fund had adequate resources to absorb the added cost. They stipulated 
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further that they did not believe that discretionary funds should be used to fund 
entitlement programs. [Ref. 33: p. 65, Ref. 29: pp. 490-491] The full House then quickly 
passed the Defense Appropriations bill on June 29th by a 330-91 vote. [Ref. 29: p. 488] 
The Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, despite previous opposition 
by the committee's chairman, Senator Inouye, during the Warner Amendment debate, 
supported the military COLA advance. They included the $376 million appropriation 
required to advance the military COLA. The full Senate Appropriations Committee also 
included the appropriation required to advance the military COLA and passed the bill on 
July 29th by a vote of30-0. [Ref. 29: p. 493, Ref. 34: p. 375] This also occurred despite 
the earlier opposition of Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, to the Warner Amendment. [Ref 18: p. 14] The full Senate adopted the 
measure on August 11th. With passage ofboth the House and Senate Appropriations 
bills, the matter was next considered in the Defense Appropriations Conference. 
The conference agreement of September 26, 1994 included the appropriation to 
fund the shift. In so stating, the conferees made a strong statement against reductions in 
discretionary spending to fund entitlements. [Ref 35: p. 164] 
Under the rules of the Congressional Budget Act, correction of this 
disparity should be authorized in a manner that causes the increased cost 
to be borne through offsetting savings in other mandatory or entitlement 
programs. Instead, the 1995 Defense Authorization Act required the 1995 
payment for military retirees to be accelerated only if paid for in the 1995 
Defense Appropriations Act via reductions in other Department of 
Defense discretionary programs. This financing mechanism is unfortunate 
and unwise. It subverts the pay-as-you-go principle for mandatory and 
entitlement programs while hurting important defense readiness and 
modernization efforts. 
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The conferees have reluctantly agreed to fund the acceleration of 
the 1995 military COLA payment because the disparity between military 
and civilian retirees is fundamentally unfair, and other committees have 
refused to pay for it under the proper procedure. 
The legislation also stipulated that future civilian and military COLAs be 
effective simultaneously providing the President, in his 1996 budget submission, 
proposes legislative changes that honor PA YGO principles and authorization legislation 
also includes appropriate PAYGO legislative changes. [Ref 35: pp. 164-165] 
The House and Senate considered and passed the conference version on 
September 29th and the President signed the bill on September 30th. The Defense 
Appropriation Bill for FY 1995 became PL 103-335. [Ref 29: p. 488] With this new law, 
which synchronized the military and civil service COLA dates in FY 1995, Congress and 
the President reversed the first of 4 years of COLA disparity. Additionally, the law 
provided preliminary guidance to fix the problem again in 1995 (FY 1996) and then 
directed that the out year COLAs be paid simultaneously. This represented progress· 
toward COLA equity restoration but still left the problem unresolved for FY 1996. 
2. Fiscal Year 1996 
The legislative activity surrounding the COLA equity issue in 1994 (FY 1995) 
represents to some extent, a pinnacle in military COLA activity. With the elections in 
1994, the Republican Party achieved a majority in both the House and Senate of the 
104th Congress. With the change in party leadership, the context ofthe budget debate 
shifted dramatically toward deficit reduction. As Senator Sarbanes indicated in the 
Warner Amendment debate, to achieve serious deficit reduction by engaging 
entitlements, health care and Social Security costs must be addressed. [Ref 28: p. S. 
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8083] And so the larger debate in 1995, curtailing high end entitlement programs and 
achieving a balanced budget, dominated the legislative agenda. The bigger budget 
issues largely overshadowed smaller ones, like military COLA equity. The groundwork 
for the military COLA date advance had been accomplished in 1994. Congress agreed in 
principle and legislation that the different dates were unfair and indicated that the issue 
should be rectified in FY 1996 and beyond. 
The Appropriations bill in 1994 (FY 1995) required that in order for the military 
COLA to coincide with its civil service counterpart, two things had to happen. The 
President had to propose legislative changes to support the COLA shift that honored 
PAYGO, and the authorizing committees had t<? do the same. [Ref 35: p. 488] 
The President's FY 1996 budget was submitted to Congress on February 6, 1995. 
It included a legislative proposal to shift the FY 1996 military COLA effective date to the 
civil service date. The budget submission also proposed that funding for the added cost 
come from the Military Retirement Fund. This is the same suggestion offered by the 
House Appropriations Committee a year earlier. [Ref 36: pp. 377-378, Ref 37: p. 408] 
The House and Senate Budget Committees then considered their budget objective 
guidelines for their respective committees. The House Budget Committee did not 
provide specific discussion or policy assumptions regarding military COLAs. The Senate 
Budget Committee proposed conformance ofthe military and civilian retiree COLA 
effective dates. The budget conferees included the Senate assumptions of coincident 
dates in the Final Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY 1996. [Ref 38: pp.14-18, 
100-109, Ref 39: p. 79] 
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The Concurrent Resolution on the Budget was passed on June 29th in the House 
by a vote of239-194, and in the Senate by a vote of54-46. [Ref. 40: p. 1901] Next, the 
respective committees considered legislative proposals to achieve the requisite deficit 
reduction targets specified in the budget resolution. 
The House Committee on National Security, in their version of the National 
Defense Authorization Act, included a date shift of the military retiree COLA from 
October 1st to April 1st of 1996. They specifically authorized $403 million for the 
Military Personnel Account to fund the date advance. However, again they found 
themselves committed to proposing payment for an entitlement program from 
discretionary funds. As in 1994, they again made a strong statement discouraging the 
practice. [Ref. 41: pp. 232-233] 
The committee is disappointed that the President's initiative 
within the budget request to resolve the disparity between the two groups 
of retirees was proposed in such a manner as to compel the committee to 
once again use scarce discretionary funds to address a mandatory spending 
initiative. Because the committee has no ability to provide a mandatory 
offset for the Administration's COLA equity initiative within the 050 
budget function and therefore avoid a "P A YGO" problem, under the 
Budget Enforcement Act, the committee has authorized $403 million in 
the personnel account to restore equity in COLA payment dates. This 
decision once again demonstrates the committee's resolve to protect the 
purchasing power of military retired pay. However, the committee 
remains committed to seeking through the budget process a solution that 
does not require funding from discretionary accounts. 
The full House considered and passed the National Defense Authorization Act on 
June 15, 1995 by a 300-126 vote. [Ref. 42: p. 1942] 
The Senate Armed Services Committee also considered and incorporated a 
provision to shift the COLA dates. The committee recommended that the military retired 
58 
pay COLA for 1996 occur on April 1, 1996. They also indicated that future COLAs 
should be paid thereafter on January 1st of each year (January 1st is the permanent law 
normal COLA payment date). [Ref 43: p. 257] The committee proposal was considered 
by the Senate and passed on September 6th. [Ref 44: p. 3092] 
The House and Senate Conference convened to consider the Defense 
Authorization legislation. Significant political issues, including a ban on military 
subsidized abortions and deployment of an anti-missile defense system, which were 
included in defense authorization, prolonged the conference. [Ref 45: p. 3469] 
Compromise was finally reached on these matters and the committee reported legislation 
that addressed the COLA issue. During FY 1996, the COLA for military retirees would 
be paid on April 1st. If a military COLA was warranted in FY 1998, that COLA would 
be paid on October 1, 1998. However, if in FY 1998, civil service retirees were to 
receive a COLA on any date earlier than the military date, the military COLA would 
advance to the earlier date and would be paid at the same time. 
The structure of the FY 1998 authorization language reflected uncertainty about 
the civil service COLA. [Ref 46: pp. 186-187] Through separate legislation under 
consideration, the date ofthe civil service COLA might have been delayed to April 1st in 
FY 1998. This would have been an extension ofthe OBRA 1993 civilian COLA delay. 
The Balanced Budget Act provision for civil service COLAs proposed delaying the 
civilian COLAs to April 1st in each year during 1996-2002. [Ref 47: p. 179] The House 
considered and passed the conference agreement on December 15th by a 267-149 vote. 
The Senate adopted the conference report on December 19th 51-43. 
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However, when the bill went to the President, he vetoed it on December 28th. 
His chief objections involved the anti-missile defense system included in the 
Authorization bill. The President felt the policy implications of an anti-missile defense 
system as outlined in the Authorization bill, violated the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic 
Missile defense) Treaty. Additionally, he objected to other politically sensitive issues 
including a ban on military sponsored abortions and a provision requiring that AIDS-
positive service members be discharged within 6 months of discovery. [Ref 48: pp. 
3897-3898] 
Interestingly, although the military COLA date shift in the Authorization bill was 
bugetarily insignificant, it played a role in the larger debate relating to the Authorization 
Bill's veto. The COLA shift and the active duty pay raise were offered by the bill's 
proponents as an indicator ofPresidential hypocrisy in the post-veto public debate. The 
argument was that the President, while aggressively pursuing a troop deployment to 
Bosnia, was willing to prolong service members' hardships by vetoing their pay raise and 
the retiree cola advance. [Ref 48: p. 3897] 
After the veto, the House vote to override the veto failed 240-156. [Ref 49: p. 61] 
The House and Senate conferees reconvened. By January 19th, the conferees had 
reached an agreement they felt satisfied the President's objections. The House and 
Senate both passed the revised conference agreement on January 24th and 26th, 
respectively [Ref 50: p. 154, Ref 51: p. 225] The President signed the Defense 
Authorization Bill on February 10, 1996 [Ref 52: p. 507]. 
With the Defense Authorization Bill signed on February 10, 1996, the military 
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COLA date shift was final. The appropriations bill required to fund the shift had already 
become law, without the President's signature, in December. [Ref. 53: p. 3773] But 
review of the FY 1996 Appropriations process aids in fuller understanding of the budget 
process in 1995. 
The House Appropriations Committee considered the matter first. They 
expressed their support for the military COLA date advance. [Ref. 54: p. 20] The full 
House then began debate on July 31. While the House version expressed support, no 
specific appropriations assumptions about the military COLA date advance were 
included. However, politically charged funding issues, such as the purchase of additional 
B-2 Stealth Bombers and military-subsidized abortions, dominated the debate and 
delayed the vote [Ref. 55: p. 2384]. The House passed its version ofthe Defense 
Appropriations Bill on September 7, 1995. [Ref. 55: p. 2384, Ref. 56: p. 3773] 
The Senate Appropriations Committee did not expressly address the COLA date 
shift in its DoD Appropriations Bill. However, there was language in the bill expressing 
the committee's intent to enhance programs that support military members and their 
family needs. The Senate version of the Defense Appropriations bill passed on 
September 8th and the bill went to conference. [Ref. 56: p. 3773] 
There were two defense appropriations conferences in 1995. The military COLA 
advance was not specifically included in either conference report, but the final bill did 
appropriate funds from the military personnel account to pay retirees subject to 
permanent law. With an FY 1996 Authorization bill in law, this would clear the way for 
an April 1st payment. [Ref. 62: p. 30] The first defense appropriations conference report 
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failed to pass a House vote 151-267 on September 29th. Again, the major objections 
involved B-2 procurement and military sponsored abortion funding. [Ref 57: p. 3013] 
The conferees reconvened. The second conference reported on November 15th. The 
new report kept provisions to purchase more stealth bombers but softened the anti-
abortion language. The revised conference report passed both the House and Senate on 
November 16th. The bill, which he was expected to veto, next went to the President. 
[Ref 58: p. 3550] 
Many Democrats expected the President to veto the Defense Appropriations Bill. 
However, while the President objected to both the added defense spending associated 
with increases for procurement and the abortion ban issue, he was also committed to 
provide U. S. forces to Bosnia as part of a Balkan peace agreement. Funding the peace 
enforcement mission required passing the Appropriations Bill. In an expression of 
objection, the President did not sign or veto the bill, instead allowing it to become law 
without his signature. This occurred on December 1, 1995. [Ref 59: p. 3672] 
Between the Appropriations and the Authorization Process, the military COLA 
for FY 1996 was advanced from October 1, 1996 to April1, 1996. The COLA was 2.6 
percent and was paid simultaneously to both the military and federal civil service retirees. 
[Ref 60: p. 28] 
Throughout the Authorization and Appropriations process, the respective 
committees indicated that advancing the military COLA to coincide with the federal civil 
service COLA would have to be paid for by reducing discretionary defense spending. 
However, without specific detailed committee notes, it is difficult to determine which 
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accounts were identified to provide the necessary funds. General statements in 1994 (FY 
1995) indicated that Operations and Maintenance (O&M) provided the bulk ofthe 
funding as well as contributions from personnel account savings. [Ref 29: p.495] This is 
consistent with the final spending analysis in that O&M was reduced in the final 
appropriation by over $1 billion from the budget request, while the Military Personnel 
account remained relatively constant despite a force reduction of85,000 service members 
from the 1994 level. The O&M reduction occurred while the other major spending 
accounts were increased. [Ref 29: p. 489, 495] 
A similar problem exists with specifically discerning where the funds came from 
to pay for the COLA date shift for 1995 (FY 1996). The final Appropriations language 
authorized spending from the Military Personnel account to fund the COLA increase. 
What funds, if any, were used to replenish the Military Personnel account remains 
difficult to track. During the COLA advance debate, two sources were referenced. First, 
O&M reductions provided one potential source and the proceeds from the sale of 
strategic reserve assets provided another. Contributions from both of these sources were 
enacted in the 1995 Authorization and Appropriations legislation. Specifically tracking 
these funds to the Military Personnel account is infeasible. 
However, reductions in O&M provided over $832 million in general savings, 
while sales of strategic mineral reserves was estimated to yield $649 million in added 
revenue over seven years.[Ref 62: p. 45, Ref 63: p. 2929] Significant additional savings 
were anticipated from the sale of petroleum from the Naval Petroleum reserves at Elk 
Hills. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates valued these sales at $2.2 billion 
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over seven years. [Ref 62: p.2929] These savings and additions net an adequate sum to 
pay for the military COLA advance, estimated to cost $356 million for FY 1996 [Ref 61: 
p.2]. 
The COLA legislation following the cuts required by the OBRA of 1993 served to 
eliminate the disparity between the military and federal civil service retirement COLA 
effective dates. In the end, both programs had their effective dates shifted from January 
1st, the permanent law effective date, to Aprillst in both 1995 and 1996. Additionally, 
the 1995 and 1996 Defense Authorization bills tied the two programs together in fiscal 
1998 and beyond. The current legislative effective date for both the military and civil 
service COLAs in FY 1997 and beyond is January 1st. [Ref 64: p. 21] Considering the 
ongoing deficit reduction imperative, this issue is likely to be revisited. 
The COLA debate was not the only military retirement concern facing the 1 04th 
Congress in 1995. Like the OBRA of 1993 budget process, the Concurrent Resolution on 
the Budget in 1995 (FY1996) provided the House Committee for National Security and 
the Senate Armed Service Committee new deficit reduction targets. Once again, military 
retirement was targeted for cuts. The next chapter addresses another military retirement 
initiative, "High-One," considered by Congress. 
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VI. PROPOSED RETIREMENT ADJUSTMENTS BY THE 104TH CONGRESS 
While the 1 04th Congress grappled with permanently reversing the OBRA of 
1993 COLA delays and finding substitute funding to pay for the date disparity reversal, 
another retirement-related proposal to achieve additional deficit reduction surfaced. 
"High-One" as it has been termed, was a proposal that sought to change the retirement 
benefit formula for service members who entered service prior to September 8, 1980. 
[Ref 65: p. 18] The proposal began in May 1995 with the Senate Budget Committee and 
their version of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY 1996. It was defeated in 
September. Like the COLA debates, the High-One proposal and the ensuing debate 
provide an important perspective on how Congress views military retirement while 
pursuing its deficit reduction objectives. It also illustrates the impact an effective 
constituent campaign can have. This chapter describes High-One's short but interesting 
legislative life. 
A. HIGH-ONE 
The High-One proposal sought to alter the military retirement benefit 
computation formula for service members who entered service prior to September 8, 
1980 and retired after September 30, 1995. This population ofpotential retirees is 
governed by the Current System described in Chapter II. The procedural change 
proposal involved altering the retirement basis from the basic pay in the last month of 
service to an average of the last 12 months ofbasic pay. The averaged monthly basic 
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pay would then be included in the same computation formula for the Current System 
described in Chapter II. 
Using an average vice the monthly basic pay in the month of retirement 
potentially reduces retirement expenditures by diluting the effects of various raises 
service members receive. There are three types of basic pay raises. These include annual 
CPI inflation-based raises, longevity raises and promotion raises. Under the Current 
System, if a service member were to receive either a longevity or an annual CPI based 
raise in a given month and then retire in the following month, that entire raise would be 
reflected in his retirement basis. Under High-One, the effect of that raise would be 
averaged with the previous 11 month's pay to determine the retirement basis, thereby 
reducing the service member's benefit and retirement expenditures. Promotion raises 
increase the retirement computation basis, but would be minimally influenced by High-
One because most minimum time in grade requirements for promotion exceed 12 months. 
The following is an example ofHigh-One's impact on an annual raise. An E-7 
who retired in February 1996 with 20 years of service would have a monthly basic pay of 
$2,261. This pay includes the FY 1996 pay raise of 2.4 percent. Under the Current Plan, 
this would be the monthly basis for his retirement benefit. At exactly 20 years, this 
service member would receive 50 percent of that basis or $1, 131 per month. If this same 
E-7 were to retire under High-One, his computational basis would be the average of the 
last 12 months of basic pay. In this case," 11 months at $2,208 and 1 month at $2,261. 
The High-One computed basis would be $2,212 and his monthly retired pay would be 
$1,106. Ifthat E-7 had received a longevity increase in January 1996, as well as the pay 
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raise, under High-One the computational basis would be $2, 187 with monthly retired pay 
or $1,093. [Ref 66: p. 4] 
B. THE BUDGET PROCESS 
1. Budget Resolution 
The High-One based deficit reduction objectives were first included in the Senate 
version of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY 1996. The specific deficit 
reduction targets were $338 million between fiscal1996-2000, and a 7 year objective 
that totaled $649 million by FY 2002. The FY 1996 High-One contribution was only $21 
million. [Ref 67: p. 127] The House Concurrent Resolution on the Budget did not 
include High-One or any other military retirement adjustment assumptions as part of its 
deficit reduCtion plan. Instead, the House version called for $2 billion in deficit reduction 
from the sale ofNaval Petroleum Reserve assets. [Ref 68: p. 132] 
The conferees included both the House and Senate deficit reduction objectives in 
the Final Concurrent Resolution on the budget. The conference report retained the 
Senate's High-One assumptions and its specific deficit reduction targets as reported in 
the Senate Budget Resolution. Specifically, the $649 million in savings through FY 2002 
remained intact. The House revenue objectives from the sale of petroleum reserves was 
reduced in the conference report from $2 billion to $1,550 million. [Ref 69, p. 50] 
The conferees reported out on June 26th. Both the House and Senate approved 
the Conference Report on June 29th. The House and Senate Authorization Committees 
then had until September 22nd to report legislation that achieved the specified targets. 
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[Ref 40: p. 1901] The committees responsible for High-One were the House National 
Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
2. Authorization 
The High-One debate began in the House National Security Committee. With an 
aggressive deficit reduction agenda, the Republicans reluctantly supported High-One 
legislation. Although they were not happy with the prospect of cutting military pensions, 
they felt compelled to do so because of the Budget Resolution. Rep. Fowler (R-Fla) 
explained "we're caught between a rock and a hard place" when discussing High-One. 
[Ref 71: p. 2385] 
Democrats on the House National Security Committee argued that High-One 
amounted to reneging on a retirement contract with the more senior service members. 
They added that High-One was particularly troubling in that it could affect service 
members already committed to retire in 90 or more days, implying a more unsettling 
contractual breach since these service members could not extend their service to mitigate 
the impacts of High-One. Rep. Peterson (D-Fla), a veteran with 6 years as a Prisoner of 
War in Vietnam, suggested that the bill be called the "Vietnam Veterans Retirement 
Reduction Act" since it affected all remaining active service members from Vietnam. 
[Ref 70: p. 2385] A Democratic representative from Texas, Chet Edwards, offered an 
amendment to eliminate pension language from the legislation. On a party-line House 
National Security Committee vote of22-29, this amendment was defeated. [Ref 70: p. 
2385] 
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Also included in the House National Security Committee bill was the provision to 
sell Naval Petroleum Reserves. This portion of the bill created little controversy. 
The committee deadline to report reconciliation legislation was 6 weeks away. 
However, the House National Security Committee, eager to pass its reconciliation 
legislation before the August recess, voted on August 1st. The bill authorizing High-
One retirement changes and the petroleum sales passed the House National Security 
Committee by a 31-21 vote. The House began its summer recess on August 4th to 
reconvene on September 6th. [Ref 70: p. 2385, Ref 71: p. 2327] During this recess, 
High-One political fallout began. 
3. High-One Political Ramificatio~s 
During the congressional recess, an extensive campaign against High-One 
developed. First, the senior military leadership responded. On August 2nd, one day after 
the House National Security Committee vote, the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS), General Shalikashvili, along with the Vice Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, 
delivered a letter to House National Security Committee Chairman, Rep. Floyd Spence 
and the ranking minority member, Rep. Dellums. [Ref 72: pp. 1-2] Their letter attacked 
High-One on several issues. The first argument was that High-One represented an 
unacceptable breach offaith with people who have faithfully served their country. They 
insisted that "commitments must be kept." [Ref 72: pp. 1-2] 
Further, they attacked the economic assumptions ofHigh-One's potential savings 
as flawed. While High-one might serve to reduce the retirement benefit, if service 
members elect to delay retirement and remain on active duty longer to recoup the High-
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One loss, the plan might actually increase expenditures. Their example demonstrates 
this. 
In 1995, if an E-8 with 26 years of service retired1 he would receive $1,914 per 
month. Under High-One, the monthly pay would be $1,753, which represents an 8.4 
percent reduction. If this E-8 delayed retirement 12 months to get the full benefit of the 
last raise, his monthly retired pay would grow to $1,988 per month because of the 
increase for one additional year of service. This results is an added lifetime cost of 
$84,000 for this service member's retirement. If the additional year of salary for this E-8 
is considered, delaying retirement would add another $49,000 in that year alone. They 
also argued that High-One was somewhat capricious in that it would reduce retirement 
pay in a variable manner from 3-8 percent depending on individual rank and time in 
service variance. [Ref 72: pp. 1-2] 
General Shalikashvili argued further that with the military draw down not yet 
finished, an incentive to delay retirement, like High-One, would be counter-productive. 
The alternative in the face of High-One and its incentive to delay retirement would be 
involuntary retirements, a prospect the CJCS considered "abhorrent." [Ref 72: pp. 1-2] 
The CJCS letter was followed immediately by an August 4th letter from Secretary 
of Defense Perry to House Budget Committee Chairman, Rep. Kasich. Secretary Perry 
also decried High-One for its impact on morale and its unprecedented abandonment of 
grand fathering, where retirement benefits were changed for future members but not for 
current members. [Ref 73: pp. 1-2] 
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Both of these letters preceded a major mail and media campaign waged by active 
service members, various military interest groups and military retiree organizations. 
[Ref 74: p. 1] Military associations (26), veterans groups and military retiree 
associations composed a coalition structure called The Military Coalition to organize 
campaigns like the one against High-One. [Ref 75: p. 3] In this case, they were very 
vocal. Their objections stressed that High-One was a breach of faith and would hurt 
recruiting, retention and morale. [Ref 74: p.1, Ref 65: p.18] 
Not all the opposition was from service members and Democrats. On September 
13th, in a letter to the House Republican Leadership, 71 Republicans threatened to 
oppose the Balanced Budget Plan ifHigh-One was retained. Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-Tex) 
drafted the letter. In it he indicated that balancing the budget must be weighed against 
the requirement to uphold obligations. [Ref 76: p. 3] 
By the time Congress returned, the political repercussions with respect to High-
One were significant. Democrats seized the issue to highlight ideological differences 
between the parties. President Clinton, speaking on September 2nd during a 50th 
anniversary ceremony marking the end of World War II, vowed not to break 
commitments made to our service members. [Ref 75: p. 3] 
Amazingly, there are those today who believe that in order to 
balance the budget it's alright to break our commitment ... for men and 
women who have served at least 15 years. As long as I am President we 
are not going to break our word to members of the Armed Forces. 
The Senate Majority Leader, Senator Dole came out against High-One on 
September 1st. In his rejection ofHigh-One, he offered to find an acceptable alternative 
to achieve the requisite deficit reduction so High-One did not have to be implemented. In 
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a letter to Secretary of Defense Perry, Dole suggested the sale of defense related surplus 
military equipment. [Ref 75: p. 3] 
By early September, the Senate Armed Services Committee had not yet drafted its 
reconciliation legislation. Instead, the Senate Armed Services Committee decided to wait 
and see whether any alternative to High-One could be achieved. They delayed writing 
their portion of the reconciliation legislation until late September. In the meantime, the 
House National Security Committee began to explore alternatives to High-One. 
One alternative considered that might achieve the same level of deficit reduction, 
thereby allowing High-One to be abandoned, was to increase commissary surcharges. 
Commissaries are defense subsidized grocery stores utilized by service members and 
retirees. The DoD surcharge expenditure, considered a mandatory entitlement 
expenditure, serves to reduce commodity prices charged to· customers. If the defense 
surcharge contribution was reduced and the commissary customer surcharge portion 
increased, the necessary savings could be achieved. The DoD argued against this 
alternative, indicating it would merely shift one retirement cut to another since many 
retirees utilize commissaries. [Ref 64: p. 4] 
A second alternative considered was a reduction in unemployment benefits 
provided to separating service members. Under current law, service members who leave 
military service are eligible to receive unemployment benefits within 1 week of 
separation and the benefits last up to 26 weeks. The savings proposal recommended 
delaying the entitlement period from 1 to 4 weeks and shortening the eligibility period to 
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13 weeks, vice 26 weeks. Younger service members and their representative 
organizations opposed this alternative. It, too, was not adopted. [Ref 64: p. 4] 
A third alternative considered by both the House National Security Committee 
and the Senate Armed Services Committee involved the sale of stockpiled surplus assets. 
First suggested by Senator Dole, this option appeared most advantageous of the three. It 
permitted abandoning High-One without hurting any competing personnel programs. 
Further, it seemed consistent with perceptions that with the Cold War over, the 
requirement to maintain large stockpiles of strategic assets and minerals had been 
reduced. [Ref. 64: p. 4] 
By September 13th, House National Security Committee Chairman Spence and 
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Thurmond had reached an acceptable 
alternative in order to abandon High-One and still achieve the required deficit reduction. 
The plan called for the sale of surplus military equipment as well as excess quantities of 
minerals held in strategic reserve. During a September 14th announcement, Rep. Spence 
said: [Ref. 77: p. 2827, Ref. 76: p. 3] 
High-One will never see the light of day .... My proposal will keep 
faith both with our men and women in uniform and with this Congress's 
commitment to balance the budget in seven years. 
After the announcement, details still had to be resolved. The final agreement 
called for sales of strategic minerals such as aluminum, platinum, rubber, etc. These 
sales were in addition to the already agreed upon petroleum sales. Once the mineral sales 
were agreed upon, CBO was required to provide an estimate to ensure that the projected 
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revenues would achieve the necessary revenue target. The CBO estimate supported the 
asset sale, indicating is would achieve the required $649 million. [Ref 78: p. 3127] 
An interesting political sidebar emerged in the announcement of the High-One 
alternative. Rep. Spence congratulated House National Security Committee Republicans 
for finding a solution. The House National Security Committee ranking minority 
member, Rep. Dellums, challenged Spence's announcement, indicating Republicans had 
only "succeeded in undoing their own work." [Ref 63: p. 2929] Rep. Edwards, who 
had previously sponsored an amendment to abandon High-One, later said, "For the 
Republicans to take sole credit is like a physician shooting someone and then saving his 
life," about the Republican High-One claims. [Ref 63: p. 2929] Spence apologized to 
House Democrats, next attempting to divert blame to the administration by charging that 
DoD had been "conspicuously unresponsive" in seeking a solution to High-One. 
Separately however, defense officials had worked closely with Senate Armed Services 
Committee members in pursuit ofHigh-One alternatives, challenging the legitimacy of 
Rep. Spence's unresponsiveness claims. [Ref 76: p. 3, Ref 77: p. 2827] 
The final legislative defeat ofHigh-One occurred on September 20th when the 
House National Security Committee voted 50-0 to adopt the asset sale changes and 
eliminate High-One from their reconciliation legislation. With their input submitted, the 
final House version ofthe reconciliation bill, the Seven Year Balanced Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1995 passed a full House vote on October 26, 1995 by a 227-203 
vote. [Ref 80: p. 3914, Ref 81: p. 3287] 
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The Senate Armed Services Committee reconciliation legislation never included 
High-One retirement change language. Instead it included the original petroleum reserve 
sales and added the strategic mineral sales. The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 
15-1 on September 18th. [Ref 63: p. 2929, Ref 79: p. 8] Their legislation was included 
in the final Senate version of the Balanced Budget Act of 1995. This legislation passed a 
Senate· vote 52-47 on October 28th. [Ref 80: p. 3914, Ref 82: 3290] 
House and Senate conferees drafted the final version ofthe Balanced Budget Act 
of 1995 and returned it to the House and Senate for final passage. Both the House and 
Senate passed the bill on November 17th, the House by a 237-189 vote and the Senate by 
a 52-47 vote. [Ref 80: p. 3914, Ref 84: p. 3512] However, when the bill went to 
President Clinton, it was vetoed on December 6, 1995. With no chance of an override, 
the legislation died. 
One interesting side note with respect to High-One's legislative defeat occurred 
even prior to the House National Security Committee's September 20th vote to abandon 
High-One. On September 7th, the House ofRepresentatives answered the public's 
outcry against High-One by including an amendment in their FY 1996 DoD 
Appropriations Bill. The amendment prohibited the use of funds to administer any High-
One changes related to retirement. This amendment, which was included in the final 
Appropriations Conference Report and ultimately became law, made it fiscally 
impossible to implement High-One in FY 1996. [Ref 64: p. 3, Ref 62: p. 45] 
Even before the President's veto ofthe Balanced Budget Act, High-One had been 
defeated by a concerted opposition campaign. Considering the meager deficit reduction 
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contribution--$338 million in the first 5 years and only $21 million in FY 1996--
compared to the political outcry and legislative attention required, High-One seems in 
retrospect to have been an impractical initiative. Additionally, the sale of military assets 
appears to be a limited means to achieve deficit reduction. But while they both appear to 
be an inefficient pursuit of deficit reduction, they clearly indicate the diligence and 
specificity Congress employs in performing its budget responsibilities. As pressure to 
achieve deficit reduction and balanced budgets continues, Congress will continue to seek 
new ways to accomplish its mission. As High-One demonstrates, no contribution is too 
small or insignificant to escape attention. 
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Vll. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This thesis addresses military retirement reform and its contribution to deficit 
reduction. Specific attention focuses on legislative initiatives in both the 1 03rd and 
104th Congresses. In 1993, the 103rd Congress achieved military-related deficit 
reduction through delays in implementation of COLAs for military retirees. However, 
the source and amount of deficit reduction turned out to be different than originally 
intended. Subsequent legislation achieved the same amount of deficit reduction but did 
so with a reduced amount accruing from the original COLA delay. Later changes 
shortened the entitlement delays and shifted defense entitlement deficit reduction to other 
accounts. So while the deficit reduction objectives were met, the impact on military 
retirement changed. 
A second interesting situation arises when the process is viewed sequentially. 
The 1 03rd Congress sought deficit reduction by delaying COLAs. Subsequent legislative 
initiatives sought to retreat from these original measures while preserving the savings 
associated with COLA delay. The 104th Congress continued the retreat from the 9-
month-military COLA delay, reducing it again to only 3 months. However, while 
retreating from the COLA delays and responding to new reconciliation instructions, the 
104th Congress embarked on a new military-retirement-related deficit reduction 
initiative. So while Congress was trying to undo one military retirement benefit 
reduction, it embarked on yet another attempt to achieve deficit reduction by reducing 
military retirement. Understanding the sequence and the process helps explain this 
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seemingly contradictory behavior. It also provides the necessary understanding from 
which reasonable inferences about future military retirement legislative policy might be 
drawn. 
A. 103RD CONGRESS 
In the OBRA of 1993, Congress included both military and federal civil service 
COLA delays. These delays were two of the many mechanisms through which Congress 
sought to achieve deficit reduction in FY 1994 and beyond. Desired savings from 
military COLA delays totaled $2.4 billion during fiscal 1994-1998 and $788 million from 
the civil service COLA delays. [Ref 18: p. 16] The civil service COLA delays were for 
only 3 months during fiscal1994-1996. Clearly, the civil service COLA delays were of 
shorter duration and achieved less savings than the military COLA delay. By delaying 
the COLAs differently, Congress created a perceived inequity between retirement 
systems that had enjoyed practical and legislative parity since 1969. 
This inequity became the seed of at least a partial rollback of the 1993 military 
retirement adjustments. The disparity between COLA dates fueled a constituent 
opposition campaign. Subsequently, the FY 1995 military COLA was advanced to 
coincide with the civil service COLA. This was a shift in the effective date of the COLA 
from October 1995 back to April1995. The net result was to restore parity between the 
two government retirement systems. To achieve this result some of the required deficit 
reduction was shifted from military entitlements to discretionary defense spending, i.e., 
O&M and Personnel accounts. 
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B. 104TH CONGRESS 
The 1 04th Congress continued the reversal of the OBRA of 1993 in 1995 ( FY 
1996). The military retirement COLA was again advanced, this time from October 1996 
to April 1996, to coincide with the federal civil service COLA. Additionally, the later 
year delays from the OBRA of 1993 were also undone, replacing COLA delay reductions 
with other expenditure reductions and revenue measures. Since the military COLA 
delays were ultimately reduced from 9 months to 3 months during 3 years vice 5, their 
contribution to deficit reduction was reduced. The OBRA of 1993 originally anticipated 
$1.22 billion in savings from delayed military COLAs through FY 1996. With the post-
OBRA reversals, this total was reduced to approximately $524 million, with the 
remaining deficit reduction shifted to other accounts. These offsets included O&M and 
Personnel reductions and revenue increases from the sale of petroleum reserves. [Ref. 
18: p. 16] 
While the 104th Congress was reversing the military COLA delay, a second 
military-retirement-related deficit reduction initiative was emerged. High-One, a 
proposed change to reduce retirement benefits for certain service members, was 
introduced with the Senate Budget Resolution of 1995. Just as the 103rd Congress had 
been given a deficit reduction objective in 1993, which led to the OBRA of 1993, the 
1 04th Congress now had another deficit reduction target. The desired savings totaled 
$649 million during fiscal 1996-2002. [Ref 67: p. 127] As with the post-OBRA debates, 
High-One became the subject of political opposition. Unlike the COLA delays, High-
One was ultimately defeated and replaced before becoming law. Sales of strategic 
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minerals provided the savings to replace those that would have occurred had High-One 
been implemented. 
This sequence of events seems to present contradictory legislative behavior. 
However, understanding the Congressional mandate to reduce the deficit, and the budget 
process, helps explain these events. It a] so suggests the kind of pressure military 
retirement programs will face with continued public concern about budget deficits and 
the role that entitlement spending, which includes military retirement, in the growth of 
those deficits. 
C. THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Both the military retirement COLA adjustments from the OBRA of 1993 and 
High-One, a 1995 legislative initiative, grew out ofthe budget process. The Budget 
Committees begin the Congressional budget processes by establishing general spending 
and deficit reduction guidelines. In its final form, the Concurrent Resolution on the 
Budget Conference Report represents an agreement in general fiscal terms about what 
spending limits and deficit reduction targets are to be achieved. Authorizing and 
appropriating committees in both the House and Senate then consider legislative changes 
necessary to achieve the limits or reductions specified in the budget resolution. 
This is what occurred in both 1993 and 1995 with respect to military retirement. 
The budget resolution called for cuts in mandatory spending from defense. Because most 
mandatory spending within the defense budget is composed of retirement expenditures, 
the authorization committees were forced to consider military retirement. 
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In 1993 the deficit reduction target was $2.4 billion. The authorizing committees 
elected to delay military retiree COLAs over 5 years to achieve this target. This was the 
military retirement deficit reduction contribution to the OBRA of 1993. Subsequent 
pressure persuaded Congress to partially reverse these delays. While Congress was 
involved in the COLA delay rollback in 1995, new deficit reduction targets emerged 
from the Budget Committees. 
Again engaging a deficit reduction agenda, the Budget Committees of the 1 04th 
Congress presented new deficit reduction objectives for the authorizing committees in 
1995. The House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services 
Committee were tasked with achieving $338 million in mandatory spending deficit 
reduction during fiscal1996-2000. [Ref 68: 132] This led to the High-One initiative. 
In both cases, the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed 
Services Committee were given deficit reduction targets from mandatory defense 
spending. Because the overwhelming majority of the defense spending within the 
committees' jurisdiction is discretionary, they were forced to focus on military 
retirement. The COLA reversals represent a reasonable legislative response to public 
feedback. Legislation was considered, adopted and when the full social and political 
consequences were illuminated, legislators reconsidered and chose an alternative. 
However, while this was ongoing, the budget process and the pressure to reduce 
spending, including entitlements, also continued, and the committees were required to 
revisit military retirement. So while events seem contradictory, they represent the 
legislative and budget process working within a deficit-driven environment. 
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Instead of suggesting a contradictory pattern, these events appropriately highlight 
the deficit reduction pressure Congress experiences. Additionally, they suggest the 
attention entitlement reform, in this case military retirement, might experience in the 
future. With ongoing budget and deficit reduction pressures, Congress must continue to 
seek methods to achieve spending and deficit reduction. 
As the process is repeated again in 1996, the Senate Budget Committee gave the 
Senate Armed Services Committee another new deficit reduction objective of $649 
million during fiscal 1997-2002 to be achieved through mandatory spending reductions. 
While the committee assumptions presume that strategic mineral sales will generate the 
necessary revenue, the budget resolution and reconciliation process may yield different 
legislative initiatives. [Ref 86: pp. 40-41] With limited mandatory spending programs 
within the House National Security Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee 
jurisdictions, military retirement may experience renewed deficit reduction attention in 
the coming months, demonstrating the ongoing deficit reduction pressure Congress is 
experiencing. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The military retirement structural reforms, including High-3, Redux, and the 
High-One attempt, all emerged in response to expenditure reduction pressures. 
Establishing the MRF represents a budgetary change designed to capture savings more 
immediately. And most of the COLA initiatives, including the original transition to a 
CPI -based COLA, represent changes designed to reduce expenditures. The pattern is 
clear. From 1958 through 1995, Congress has viewed military retirement as a potential 
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source of expenditure savings. High-One, where retirement benefit reductions were 
attempted while restoring a previous reduction, highlights the enormity of the deficit 
reduction pressure Congress is under and the contribution they see military retirement 
making. 
Therefore, it seems a reasonable to conclude that mandatory defense spending, 
and more specifically, military retirement, will come under similar deficit reduction 
pressure in the future. The questions then become, what form of contribution military 
retirement might be expected to make. Past adjustments suggest that two primary forms, 
including more COLA adjustments and additional military retirement structural changes, 
are possible. 
1. COLAs 
The pattern and history of previous COLA changes, essentially annual 
adjustments or delays since 1978, suggest these types of adjustments will continue. This 
seems consistent with other political pressure with respect to CPI -based entitlement 
increases. Initiatives to reduce CPI -based increases, because of a perceived bias of the 
CPI to overstate inflation, have gained momentum. [Ref. 84: p. 25, Ref. 85: pp.1-6] If 
the CPI overstates inflation, CPI and COLA-based reforms offer significant potential 
savings. Considering that federal programs with automatic COLAs will account for $518 
billion in FY 1996 federal expenditures, even minor reductions in the CPI can yield 
potentially large savings. In FY 1996, Congress estimated that a 0.2 percent reduction in 
the CPI would save $19.5 billion in fiscal 1999-2002. [Ref 85: pp. 1-2] Certainly with 
ongoing deficit reduction pressure and the large potential savings from CPI reductions, it 
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is likely that Congress will continue to pursue such changes, military retirement benefits 
included. 
2. Military Retirement Structural Reform 
Certain aspects of structural reform, that is changing the military retirement 
system, suggest Congress may revisit this as a means to achieve deficit reduction. First, 
there has not been a structural change since 1986 suggesting this area has been 
overlooked in recent years. Next, considering High-One, Congress has demonstrated its 
willingness to attempt such a change. And finally, the accrual accounting aspect of the 
MRF offers a means to capture structural change savings immediately, creating another 
inducement for reform in light of deficit reduction pressures. 
However, other aspects suggest structural reform does not offer reasonably 
feasible contributions to deficit reduction. First, High-One demonstrated that pressure to 
grandfather military retirement reform, that is, change benefits for future members only, 
is significant. This is based on an understanding of an implied commitment. Service 
members understand the benefits and any subsequent changes in mid-career are viewed 
as a breach of faith. They argue that doing so poses potential detriment to morale, 
recruiting and retention. High-3, Redux, and the High-One debate all demonstrate 
Congress's resolve to maintain its commitments to service members by honoring the 
grand fathering principle. 
Therefore, any future retirement reform initiatives to contribute to deficit 
reduction will likely fall to future service members. While High-3 and Redux 
demonstrated Congress's willingness to do this, the potential savings absent radical 
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change suggest only marginal contributions. Consider additionally that the DoD would 
probably oppose such reforms. Opposition from the Defense leadership is likely to 
suggest that further reductions in military retirement benefits will adversely impact their 
ability to attract and retain high quality service personnel. And finally, the political 
outcry over High-One, which affected only 20 percent of forces and offered a relatively 
small contribution to deficit reduction from a total defense perspective, suggests that 
larger reforms will be more forcefully opposed. The political response to High-One 
would probably be mirrored in future retirement reform attempts. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that while Congress may consider 
future military retirement benefit reduction initiatives as a means of achieving deficit 
reduction, structural reform initiatives would generate stiff opposition. Further, in 
attempting any such change, the secondary consequences such reforms might have would 
have to be carefully considered. As with High-One, which was originally expected to 
reduce expenditures but might in practice actually have increased expenditures, future 
reforms would have to be similarly evaluated. Certainly the impact of change on military 
retirement as a force management tool would have to be considered. These considerations 
make the prospect of military retirement benefit changes and significant savings from 
military retirement reductions less probable than CPI and COLA-based reforms. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis concentrated on the budgetary aspect of military retirement. 
Certainly, the military retirement benefit plays another important role in its use as a force 
management tool. Further study might evaluate what and how well defense force 
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structure requirements are served by the current systems. To the extent that these benefit 
systems are sufficient or deficient, further analysis might suggest alternative structures to 
more accurately achieve long-term defense manning goals. 
From a budgetary perspective, additional future research might consider other 
retirement reforms and how they might serve to both reduce federal expenditures and 
enhance service member financial well-being. Suggestions include switching from the 
current defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. Another possibility includes 
establishing tax advantaged retirement-related savings accounts similar to Individual 
Retirement Accounts or 401k type contribution plans. Similar initiatives have been 
successfully employed in the private sector and might possibly, through further study, 
offer insight into how Congress and the DoD might both enhance benefits and reduce 
expenditures. 
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